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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

A CREDITOR'S RIGHTS IN SECURITIES HELD
BY HIS SURETY
By

EDWARD

G.

JENNINGS*

words bearing, in addition to the weight of their authorship,
the further weight Qf judicial decision, Dean Pound has said
that "it is elementary that a creditor is entitled to enforce for his
own benefit any securities which the principal debtor has given his
surety by way of indemnity."' On the other hand, the author of
the most recent American textbook on the law of suretyship has
concluded that the proposition so stated is not only unsupportable
by sound reasoning or analogy, but in its results "appears to violate the intent of the contracting parties, and, in addition, gives
the particular creditor to whom the surety is liable an advantage
that may be unfair either to the principal's other creditors or to
the surety or to both.' 2 The problem that provokes at the outset
such a head-on clash has not yet been the subject of direct judicial
decision in Minnesota. 3 The ensuing discussion seeks to trace its
historical development and anticipatorily to suggest a correct soluN

4

tion.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Harlan County v. Whitney, (1902) 65 Neb. 105, 106, 90 N. W. 993,
opinion by Dean Pound, then commissioner of the supreme court of Nebraska. See also the statement by Deemer, J., in Nourse v. Weitz, (1903)
120 Iowa 708, 714, 95 N. W. 251, 253: "These doctrines are very well
understood, and are sustained by the unbroken voice of authority."
2Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 376. See
also 3Merrill, Nebraska Suretyship, (1932) 10 Neb. L. Bull. 405, 444.
But see the statement by Gilfillan, C. J., in Felton v. Bissel, (1878) 25
Minn. 15, 19: "If a surety takes security for a debt, it enures not only to
his own protection, but also to that of the creditor; . . . and also to that
of his co-sureties" (dictum as regards the creditor). See also 6 Dunnell.
Minn. Dig. sec. 9089: "If a surety takes security for the debt. it enures not
only to his own protection, but also to that of the creditor and his
co-sureties:" Schmidt v. Coulter, (1861)
6 Minn. 492 (Gil. 340, 343)
(co-surety).
4
By way of general references to the problem under discussion see:
Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 369-376: 1
Brandt, The Law of Suretyship and Guaranty, 3d ed., 679-685; Colebrooke, Treatise on the Law of Collateral Securities, 2d ed., 395-398; 1
Hilliard, The Law of Mortgages. 4th ed., 344-348; 4 Kent, Commentaries
on American Law, 12th ed., 308; 2 Jones. Treatise on the Law of
Mortgages of Real Property, 8th ed.. 585-587; 2 Jones, The Law of
Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales. 6th ed., 283-284; 3 Pomeroy,
Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., 2889-2893; 5 Pomeroy, ibid., 52085209; Sheldon. The Law of Subrogation 236-255; Stearns, The Law of
Suretyship 495-500; 2 Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 14th
ed.. 123, 240; Story, Commentaries on the Law of Promissory Notes, 4th

A CREDITOR'S RIGHTS IN SECURITIES

1. ENGLISH PRECEDENTS
The doctrine that a creditor may have rights in securities
held by one standing in the relation of surety to him for another,
as it has taken root and flourished on this side of the Atlantic,
has constantly been referred to an English origin, with little attention paid to its later development and limitation in the land of its
alleged nativity. The case of Maure v. Harrison5 in chancery,
was decided in 1692, but apparently remained unreported until
1742.6 The brief report of the later date contains but the single
statement:
"A bond-creditor shall, in this court, have the benefit of all
counter-bonds or collateral security given by the principal to the
surety; as if A. owes B. money, and he and C. are bound for it,
and A. gives C. a mortgage or bond to indemnify him, B. shall
have the benefit of it to recover his debt."
In the date of its decision Maitre v. Harrison came fifty-five
years after the case of Morgan v. Seymour, wherein had been
recognized the now commonplace and fully accepted subrogation
of the surety, upon discharge by him of the principal obligation,
to the benefit of -such securities for the performance of that obligation, aside from the personal liability of the surety, as the
creditor may have received from the principal debtor. It appears
to have been the thought of Sir William Grant, M. R., in Wright
v. Morley,8 that the doctrines attributed to Maure v. Harrisonand
Morgan v. Seymour were but the converse sides of the same
shield for the protection of the party equitably entitled to the
benefit of the securities-but that if either were to be regarded as
following from the other in point of logic, it was the surety's
subrogation to the creditor's securities that followed from the
recognized rights of the creditor, in the converse situation, to the
securities held by the surety. For he there said, in reference to a
situation typical of the surety's subrogation:
ed., 337-338; 4 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed., 36243626; Willard, Right of a Creditor to His Sureties' Securities, (1880)
14 Am. L. Rev. 839; Scott, The Creditor's Right to Subject the Securities
of the Surety When They Purport to be for Indemnity Merely, (1885)
19 Am. L. Rev. 867; Williams, A Creditor's Right to His Surety's Securities,
(1888) 1 Harv. L. Rev. 326. See also Notes, (1912) 12 Col. L. Rev. 351;
(1913) 13 Col. L. Rev. 333; (1896) 10 Harv. L Rev. 64; (1920) 2 Ill.
L. Bull. 515; (1936) 43 W. Va. L. Q. 63; (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 706; 27
Am. & Eng. Enc. L., 2d ed., 203; 6 Ann. Cas. 395; 37 Cyc. 437; 19 L. R. A.

367; L. R. A. 1916C 1062; 21 R. C. L. 1094.
5(1692)
1 Equity Cases Abridged, (K) (5).
6

See In re Walker, [1892] 1 Ch. Div. 621, 629, note (1).

7(1637)

1 Rep. Ch. 120.

8(1805) 11 Vesey Jun. 12, 22.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

"I conceive that, as the creditor is entitled to the benefit of
all the securities the principal debtor has given to his surety, the
surety has full as good an equity to the benefit of all the securities
the principal gives to that creditor."
The soundness of the subrogation theory, as applied in behalf of
the creditor, is reserved for discussion in connection with the
American cases purporting to follow that theory. Suffice it to
show now that, whereas the surety's subrogation became fully
established in England, even as to securities expressly conditioned
to be void upon payment of the principal obligation, 9 the doctrine
dttributed to Maure v. Harrison was doubted by Lord Eldon in
Ex parte Waring, Inglis, Clarke,'0 decided in 1815, from that time
almost wholly displaced by the so-called "rule of Ex parte War'
ing,"11
and finally rejected entirely.
The actual facts of Maure v. Harrison remained shrouded in
oblivion for two hundred years from the date of its decision. In
1892, in the case of In re Walker,12 an English court for the first
time went back to the original registrar's book and the pleadings
in Maure v. Harrison, and discovered the facts of the earlier case
to have been as follows: Thomas Mawer, the plaintiff, was the
maternal grandfather of William Harrison, one of the defendants.
\Villiam Harrison's father had died leaving an estate of one
hundred and twenty pounds, to be divided among his three children, all minors. Thomas Mawer, being desirous that William
Harrison. although still a minor, be enabled to continue the operation of his ,father's farm, gave an indemnity bond in the full
amount of the estate to his daughter Mary, who was the administra9Surprisingly, Lord Eldon in the case of Copis v. Middleton, (1823)
Turner & Russell 224, 231, although recognizing the surety's right of
subrogation to any mortgage liens held by the creditor, for the reason
that "the mortgagor cannot get back his estate again without a conveyance." refused to permit the surety to prove as a specialty creditor by way
of subrogation to the creditor's rights under the joint bond executed by
the principal debtor in conjunction with the surety, for the reason that the
latter was thought to be extinguished by the surety's payment. The decision in Copis v. Middleton was inconsistent with that in the prior case
of Morgan v. Seymour, (1637) 1 Rep. Ch. 120, cited in note 7, above.
"and was itself abrogated by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act (19 &
20 Vict., ch. 97, sec. 5 [1856]), which saved to the surety a right of
subrogation against the principal, and of ratable subrogation against a
co-surety, notwithstanding the extinguishment at law of the creditor's
right against them by the surety's payment." Campbell, Cases on Suretyship
56. note 4; see also Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 364.
10(1815) 19 Vesey Jun. 345, 348-349, 2 Rose's Bankruptcy Cases, 182,
2 Glyn. & J. 404.
"'See Eddis, The Rule of Ex parte Waring.
12[1892] 1 Ch. Div. 621.
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trix and William Harrison's mother, so as to enable her to turn
the entire estate over immediately to William Harrison, and at
the same time be secured against the claims of her other two children. Tlereafter one of the other children died, the mother
married William Morley, and William Harrison, on becoming of
age, purported to disavow his previous receipt of the property
from his father's estate and demanded payment of his share.
William Morley gave him a bond for the payment of such share,
and William Morley with his wife Mary brought suit against
Thomas Mawer upon the bond given by him to Mary. Thomas
Mawer thereupon brought suit against them and William Harrison
to restrain the suit against himself and to have his own bond
delivered up and cancelled. The court held that William Harrison had been well paid, that the bond given to him by Morley
should therefore be released, and that the suit that had been begun
against Thomas Mawer upon the latter's bond be stayed "till
Margaret [the other child still living] doth release, and when the
plaintiff hath procured Margaret, who is not a party to the action,
to release that bond, then that bond to be delivered up," ... "but
then [in the event that Margaret should not release] the plaintiff's
bond to be at suit for the recovery of Margaret'smoiety of £ 120."
After thus bringing to light for the first time the actual facts
of Maure v. Harrismo, the court in In re Walker, through Stirling,
J.. concluded:
"So that all that was decided in that action was this: that the
plaintiff, who had given his bond of indemnity, was not entitled
to have it delivered up to be cancelled till all claims had been
settled. Under those circumstances, it appears that the point for
which it was cited in 1 Equity Cases, Abridged, could not have
been decided in that case; and that at most the reported statement
amounts to a dictum,' 3 in the course of the argument. It is now
'aBut if the language of the judgment "till Margaret doth release"
be construed as referring to the plaintiff's bond, rather than merely to

Margaret's claim against her mother, it would follow that the rights upon
the bond were not alone in the mother, the named obligee, and therefore

that the reported statement was after all something more than a dictum.
Maure v. Harrison conceivably may have stood for much the same proposi-

tion as Dutton v. Poole, (1678) 1 Vent. 318, 332, T. Jones 102, 2 Lev.
210, allowing a child to sue upon a promise made to her father, but now

regarded as having been overruled in England. See 2 Williston, Treatise
on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed., 1053. As will appear more fully in
the text, the doctrines of a creditor's rights in his surety's securities and
of the directly enforceable rights of the creditor-beneficiary of a thirdparty contract are at least partially analogous; and it may not be entirely
accidental that they have fallen together in England and still retain equal
vitality in the United States.
. The words of the judgment in Maure v. Harrison "but then the plain-
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nearly 200 years since this case was decided, and the sole authorities on a point which must have been of frequent occurrence are
these: a dictum in 1692, a dictum early in the century by Sir
William Grant in the year 1805,'- and what appears to me to be
the contrary opinion of Lord Eldon a little later. 15
"Under these circumstances, it seems to me that there is no
real authority for the proposition in question; and upon principle,
I cannot see why a surety who takes from the principal debtor a
bond or indemnity at once becomes a trustee of that for the principal creditor ..

."6

As the result of the decision in In re Walker the doctrine of
Maure v. Harrison,which had been in effect supplanted ever since
1815 by another doctrine, the so called "rule of Ex parte Waring,"
has now been erased entirely from English law. In re Walker itself was a proceeding to administer the estate of Hugh Walker,
deceased, in which the Sheffield Banking Company was claiming
the benefit of securities in the form of a mortgage and title deeds
that had been deposited by one Arthur Spencer and his wife "to
indemnify the testator in respect of his guarantee" of the current
account of Spencer Brothers, a co-partnership of which Arthur
Spencer was a member. The decision of the court was that the
Sheffield Banking Company, as a creditor of the account for
which the testator had been guarantor, "must simply be left to
prove against the estate of the testator for what is due them, without having the exclusive benefit of these securities in respect of
IT
which payments have been made to the estate.."

No distinction was made by the court between the mortgage
given by Arthur Spencer himself, who was one of the principal
debtors, and the title deeds deposited by his wife, who was a
stranger to the principal obligation. It would seem therefore to
be clear that by the present law in England the creditor has no
direct rights of his own accruing by operation of law or equity in
securities held by the surety for his own indemnity, whether such
securities proceed from the principal debtor or from another. The
securities remain for the purpose alone of effectuating the intent
tiff's bond to be at suit for the recovery of Margaret's moiety" are equivocal
-they may refer merely to the recovery by Mary, the mother, of the amount
of Margaret's moiety, since she was apparentfy already damnified in that
amount.
14
1n Wright v. Morley, (1805)
11 Vesey Jun. 12, 22, cited in note 8,
above.
15In Ex parte Waring, Inglis, Clarke, (1815) 19 Vesey Jun. 345,
348-349, cited in note 10, above.
16[1892] 1 Ch. Div. 621, 629.
'-[1892] 1 Ch. Div. 621, 629.
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of the indemnity agreement as between the principal debtor or indemnitor and the surety, which was solely for the latter's protection. The creditor receives all for which he actually bargained,
which was the personal liability of both the principal debtor and
the surety; and, without further facts appearing, the significance
of which will presently be considered, he is not entitled upon any
theory of subrogation to insist upon the enforcement for his
benefit of the surety's own rights in the securities.
The court in In re Walker also specifically negatived the possibility upon any other theory of a trust having arisen for the
creditor's benefit. Lord Eldon appears once to have held that
"where a security had been given to a surety upon trust to apply
the proceeds in paying off the creditor," the latter became the
cestui que trust and could enforce the application of the proceeds
accordingly.18 There is of course nothing in the position of a
surety that would necessarily prevent him from acting also as
trustee, for the person to whom he owes the debt, of securities
appropriated to its payment. But under a specific appropriation
of the securities to the payment of the debt, as distinguished from
the purpose of merely personal indemnity to the surety, it was
9
held in Wilding -'. Richards"
that creditors without notice of
the appropriation derived no direct rights thereunder. Such a
result is of course consistent with the English rule to the effect that
even an express assignment by a debtor for the benefit of his
creditors vests no direct rights as cestuis que trust in the creditors,
but operates instead as .a continuing offer to the creditors made
through the assignee as agent of the debtor, which therefore becomes irrevocable as sodn as the creditors properly manifest their
assent thereto.20
But the theory of a continuing offer to the creditor does not
appear to have been applied by the English courts in any case
of securities deposited by an ordinary debtor with his surety
for the payment of the debt; nor have the English courts extended
to the creditor in this situation the same liberality with trust
principles that they have at times displayed in favor of the beneficiary of an ordinary -third-party contract.2 ' . In fact the case.,
applying the so-called "rule of Ex parte Waring," to be con1SEx parte Rushforth, (1805) 10 Vesey Jun. 409, 421. See Rowlatt,
The Law of Principal and Surety, 3d ed., 201.
11(1845)
1 Coll. 655.
20
See 2 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed., 1036.
21 See 2
Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed., 10551056.
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sidered presently, require exactly such a specific appropriation of
the securities for the payment of the debt ;22 yet it is the underlying assumption of all such cases, as will be shown, that the
creditor acquires no direct rights of his own in the securities, even
2
after receiving notice and assenting.
If in such a case of the specific appropriation of the securities
to the payment of the debt the creditor can show a trust for his
benefit to have been expressly intended by the parties to the
security agreement, or is himself a party to such agreement, he
may of course acquire the same rights that would have been his
had the securities been given directly to him in the first place.24
But otherwise, as regards the existence of direct rights in the
creditor, nothing seems to turn in England upon whether the
securities held by the surety have been deposited merely for his
own indemnity for loss actually suffered through payment by him
of the principal debt or a part thereof, or instead have been appropriated specifically to the payment of the debt itself. To the
extent that the two problems are at least partially analogous, the
English courts are in this respect consistent with their refusal
to accord either direct or derivative rights to the beneficiaries of
third-party contracts.

2

1

As already intimated, the case of Ex parte Waring, Inglis,
Clarke,28 decided in 1815, gave rise to a doctrine all of its own,
effectively supplanting Maure v. Harrison long before the latter
doctrine was finally repudiated in its entirety. The facts of
Ex parte Waring, Inglis, Clarke were as follows: Brickwood &
Company were bankers in London, and Bracken & Company
were manufacturers in Lancashire and customers of Brickwood &
22
See Ex parte Dever, (1885) L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 611, 623; City Bank
v. Luckie, (1870) L. R. 5 Ch. App. 773, 777; In re New Zealand Banking
Corporation, (1869) L. R. 7 Eq. 449, 454-455; In re Belfast Warehouse
Co., [1897] 1 Ir. Rep. Ch. Div. 124, 131-133; and see below, pp. 330-331
of text,
23 notes 47-50 inclusive.
See Royal Bank of Scotland v. Commercial Bank of Scotland, (1882)
L. R. 7 App. Cas. 366, 384; In re General Rolling Stock Co., (1869)
L. R. 4 Ch. App. 423, 429; In re Joint Stock Discount Co., (1868) L. R.
6 Eq. 491, 495-496; In re Richview Brickworks Co., Ltd., [18971 1 Ir.
Rep. Ch. Div. 176, 183; Bank of Ireland v. Perry, (1871) L. R. 7 Exch.
14, 20;
and see below, pp. 327-329 of text, notes 37-42 inclusive.
24
Compare the statement of the English law contained in the 1936
edition of Rowlatt, The Law of Principal and Surety 200-201: "A creditor can derive no benefit from securities given by the principal to the
surety unless he can show a direct interest in them by contract or under
a trust, or unless both principal and surety are bankrupt, and the rule
in Ex
parte Waring is found applicable."
2
5See 2 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed., 1053-1056.
26(1815) 19 Vesey Jun. 345.
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Company. By a typical "loan of credit" arrangement, Bracken &
Company were accustomed to draw drafts for Brickwood &
Company's acceptance, having deposited securities in advance
to cover the amount of such acceptances. Brickwood & Company
thus stood in a relation in the nature of a surety, secured against
damnification, for Bracken & Company. Brickwood & Company
were not restricted to using the securities to recoup payments
actually made by them on Bracken & Company's account, but were
entitled to use the securities for the purpose of meeting their
acceptances for Bracken & Company as they fell due. Brickwood
& Company became bankrupt on July 7th, 1810, and Bracken &
Company on August 2nd, 1810. As of the former date Brickwood
& Company were under acceptances for Bracken & Company in
an amount of £24,000, and had in their hands, deposited with
them by Bracken & Company "as a security against their acceptances," £21,645 and 10 shillings of short bills, and title deeds
of premises in London which later produced on sale approximately
£2,961. Also Brickood & Company were indebted to Bracken
& Company in a cash balance of approximately £6,766.
The holders of the acceptances proved against both estates in
bankruptcy, thereby obtaining from Brickwood & Company's estate approximately £3,412. They thereupon petitioned that the
assignees of Brickwood & Company be directed to pay over the
proceeds of the short bills and title deeds, plus the sum of approximately £3,353 which represented the difference between the
credit balance of £6,766 owing to Bracken & Company and the
£3,412 that had been paid to the petitioners as a dividend from
Brickwood & Company's estate, in order that the separate sums
so obtained might be used for the payment of the petitioners in full.
The order of Lord Eldon in granting relief to the petitioners,
although not altogether clear as to the disposition to be made of
the credit balance owing from Briclkvood & Company to Bracken
& Company, 27 provided that the proceeds of the short bills and
the title deeds be devoted to the payment of the petitioners in full,
any surplus remaining to be restored to Bracken & Company's es27It does not specifically appear from the facts that the credit balance
had previously been specifically appropriated to the payment of the acceptances, as had the short bills and title deeds. Later cases apparently hold
that the "rule of Ex parte Waring" has no application to an ordinary
debt owing by the acceptor's to the drawer's estate, unless specifically
appropriated beforehand to the payment of the acceptances. Ex parte
Dickin, (1878) L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 377, 385-386. See the discussion below.
at pp. 328-329 of the text.
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tate. Should the securities prove insufficient, the billholders were
to be allowed to prove against each bankrupt estate only for the
28
amount of the unpaid balance.
In reaching this result Lord Eldon expressly refused to base
it upon either the doctrine of Maure v. Harrison or the dictum in
Wright v. Morley, both of which had been pressed by counsel, and
said:
"With regard to that case [Maure v. Harrison], or cases in general, I desire it to be understood, that I forbear to give any opinion upon that point; but I see nothing in this transaction, which,
supposing a bankruptcy had not occurred, would entitle those, who
are creditors by the acceptances of the bankers, having these deposits, to maintain an equity upon them: the effect of which would
be, that from the moment of that deposit the bankers became
trustees for those creditors; and could not come to any new
ar' 29
rangement with those, whose debts are to be so discharged.
But he continued:
"That doctrine therefore not being applicable to this case, the
view I have taken of it in other respects is this. The first consideration is, what was the nature of the demand of Bracken and
Co. who did not become bankrupt until August, upon Brickwood
and Co. at the moment of their bankruptcy, on the 7th of July.
If these billholders are to have payment in preference to the other
creditors, it must be by the effect of an equity between these two
houses, rather than by any demand directly in their own right upon
any funds in the hands of Brickwood and Co. With regard to the
demand of Bracken's house upon the 7th of July, it is impossible to
deny, that if they had either paid, or undertaken to pay, i.e. to relieve Brickwood's house from those acceptances, the short bills
and the mortgage must have been restored to them. It is on the
other hand equally clear, that they never could have raised any demand against the house, of Brickwood in respect of either the cash
balance, 0 the short bills, or the mortgage, without bringing in
the amount of those acceptances; admitting, that what the house
28
Lord Eldon thus treated the acceptance-holders as secured creditors
within the "bankruptcy" as distinguished from the "chancery" rule as to
the extent of proof that will be permitted of secured creditors who do not
waive their security rights. By the Judicature Act of 1873 the "bankruptcy"
rule became applicable to all liquidations in England, whether through
bankruptcy or equity. See Glenn, The Law Governing Liquidation 758. The
majority American state rule is otherwise, see Glenn, idem. At least one
American case has similarly limited a creditor's right of proof by virtue
of his interest in his surety's indemnifying securities. In re Jerome B.
Fickett, (1881) 72 Me. 266. The securities are treated as having for
this purpose been realized at either the moment of insolvency or the date of
maturity of the bills. See In re Barned's Banking Co., (1874) L. R. 19
Eq. 1, 10.
29(1815) 19 Vesey Jun. 345, 348-349.
80
But see note 27, above.
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of Brickwood had of their property in short bills, &c. must be
applied to the discharge of those acceptances, for the sake, not of
the billholders, but of the house of Brickwood; who had become
liable to them; and had a right to have that liability cleared away,
before any demand could arise for the Brackens.
"That then being the equity between these houses in the interval between their respective bankruptcies, it does not appear
to, me varied by the bankruptcy of the Brackens in August; supposing their assignees to have put the estate of Brickwood in the
same situation as the house they represent, if solvent, must have
done, -to entitle themselves to the short bills; and, having regard
to the demands of all the creditors and the bankrupts, in this
circuitous way, I think, the billholders must be paid, not as having
a demand upon these funds in respect of the acceptances they hold,
but as the estate of Brickwood and Co. must be cleared of the demand by their acceptances; and the surplus, after answering that
demandl, must be made good to Bracken and Co....
It appears at first to have been thought that, despite Lord
Eldon's language, the "rule of Ex parte Waring" was after all
only the doctrine of Maure v. Harrison in new raiment. For in
32
Ex parte Prescott,
involving practically the same facts as Ex
parte Waring, Inglis, Clarke, it was said by Sir G. Rose:
"I always understood, that the principle on which Ex parte
Waring was founded, was this ... that where the original intention of the parties was to appropriate property to a certain
purpose; in such *a transaction, bankruptcy would not affect that
intention, nor deprive third parties of the benefit of it.""
But it has since been dearly recognized that the insolvency
of both the drawer and acceptor, or of those standing in the relation of principal and surety as it were, instead of failing to affect
the operation of the "rule of Ex pare Waring," is absolutely indispensable to the operation of the rule at all.'* It became established that double bankruptcy, in the technical sense of both estates
31(1815) 19 Vesey Jun. 345. 349-350.

32(1834) 3 Deacon and Chitty 218, 230.
33As late as 1847 an English writer on the law of suretyship stated
the law to be: "A creditor is entitled to the benefit of all securities which
the principal debtor has given to his surety, as well as those which were
given to the creditor by the principal," citing Maure v. Harrison and Wright
v. Morley but without citing Ex parte Waring, Inglis, Clarke. Burge,

Commentaries on the Law of Suretyship 324.

341n re New Zealand Banking Corporation, (1867) L. RL 4 Eq. 226,
231-232 ("rule of Ex parte Waring" has no application where either drawer
or acceptor is not insolvent); see also In re Joint Stock Discount Co.,
(1868) L. R. 6 Eq. 491, 495. The rule has likewise been held to have no
application to the case of acceptances guaranteed by a third person at the
request of the drawer, although both guarantor and acceptor have become
insolvent. See In re Barned's Banking Co., (1868) L. R_ 3 Ch. App. Cas.
753, 756.
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being in the course of administration by a court of bankruptcy,
was not essential; but that double insolvency, plus the fact of both
estates having been brought into some form of forced judicial administration, was sufficient. 85 The requirement of some form of
forced judicial administration of both estates explains the theory
of the rule. It is that a supposedly insoluble impasse would otherwise be created. Up to the moment that the control over his own
estate is taken from him, the one standing in the position of an
indemnified surety has the power to pay the creditor and then
realize upon the securities for his own reimbursement; and he has
also, in all instances of the specific appropriation. of the securities
to the payment of the debt, or to the exoneration bf the surety as
well as his reimbursement, the right to realize upon the securities
in the first instance for the very purpose of using their proceeds
to pay the creditor. But the creditor's right against the surety
being by hypothesis in personam and unsecured, the moment that
forced administration of his own estate intervenes the surety's
power to pay the creditor in full is at an end, and the creditor is
remitted to come in along with the surety's other unsecured creditors. The surety's power to touch the securities at all, even if
they have been provided for the express purpose of giving him
the wherewithal to pay the debt in question, now depends upon
the ascertainment of the extent to which he will be required to
respond to his in personam obligation to pay that debt. This
will not ordinarily occur until the surety's final discharge. In
the meantime his security right is not a general asset of his own
estate available to his general creditors. Only after and to the
extent that he has been damnified through dividends declared from
his own estate against the principal obligation do the securities become an asset of that estate available for the benefit of his creditors generally.
On the other hand he who stands in the position of principal
debtor has also, by the forced administration of his estate,
lost the power of paying the creditor in full, which is the only
35Powles v. Hargreaves, (1853) 3 De Gex, MacNaughten and Gordon.
430, 449 et seq.; see also In re Barned's Banking Co., (1874) L. R. 19 Eq.
1, 7. But unless there is a forced administration of both estates, the mere
fact of double insolvency will not bring the "rule of Ex parte Waring" into
operation. In re Belfast Warehouse Co., [1897] 1 Ir. Rep. Ch. Div. 124.

Since the Judicature Act of 1873 the "rule of Ex parte Waring" may be
applied by a court of law upon an interpleader issue, see Engelback v.
Nixon, (1875)

L. R. 10 C. P. 645, 654-655; but the billholders must

be joined as necessary parties, see Ex parte Dickin, (1878) L. R. 8 Ch. Div.
377, 387.
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act by which he can relieve the surety of the risk of loss and thus
entitle himself to the return of the securities. The securities are
in the estate of the surety impressed, not with a trust for the
benefit of the creditor, but with a special purpose either of indemnifying the surety or of exonerating him by paying the creditor to the
extent of the surety's damnification, which cannot be ascertained
until the surety's final discharge; and except for this purpose
they remain in the estate of the principal debtor, but incapable of
immediate realization by him or for the benefit of his creditors
generally.3s
Thus it was pointed out by Lord Romilly, M. R-, in In re
Joint Stock Discount Company,37
"that Ex parte Waring, and all that class of cases, in which Lord
Eldon laid down the law very distinctly, amount to nothing more
than this, that where there is a double bankruptcy, or insolvency
... , and there are bills which one bankrupt is entitled to claim
against the other, that must be set right as between the two estates,
the consequence of which is, that the billholders, though they
get the benefit of any security that has been given for the bills,
as Lord Eldon says, indirectly, have no species of right to the
security itself."
And as stated by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Selborne, in Royal
8
Bank of Scotland v. Comimercid Bank of Scotland,"
"It is conceded (and it has always been so laid down by all
the English authorities) that billholders cannot claim to have
securities, deposited by the drawers with the acceptors for the
acceptors' indemnity, applied in payment of the bills by virtue
36
In Ex parte Manchester Bank, (1879) L R. 12 Ch-Div. 917, 925-926,
the "rule of Ex parte Waring" is said by Bacon, C. J., to be based upon
the same principle as the one applicable in working out the respective rights
of creditors of two partnerships, one of which has succeeded the other
by virtue of the death of a partner or other change in membership. See
also the same suggestion by counsel in the Maryland case of Kunkel v.

Fitzhugh, (1865) 22 Md. 567, 570. But the two situations are believed
to be dissimilar, in that partnership succession involves only the segregation

of the assets of the dissolved partnership, and the ascertainment of its

creditors, as
partnerships
creditors in
the problems

of the moment of dissolution. Common creditors of both
are not thereby given preferences over all other partnership
respect of particular assets. For a thorough discussion of
of partnership liabilities and the administration of partnership

assets, see Warren, Corporate Advantages Without Incorporation 33-140,
275-292.
Obviously the "rule of Ex parte Waring" can have no application
where the person to whom securities have been given for the acceptance

of bills did not in fact accept the bills. Vaughan v. Halliday, (1872)
L. R. 9 Ch. App. Cas. 561, 568. Since the security holder is not in fact
liable, the drawer is entitled to the immediate return of the securities to

his general assets.

37(1868) L. R. 6 Eq. 491, 495-496.
38(1882) L. R. 7 App. Cas. 366, 384.
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of any right or title of their own to the benefit of those securities.
They can, at the utmost, only claim to come in under a jus
tertii, availing themselves of the administration of the insolvent
estates (in which they have the ordinary locus standi of creditors),
to ask that the securities, which would be assets of the one estate
but for the lien and right of indemnification belonging to the
other, but which cannot be realized until that lien and right of
indemnification is discharged, may be so applied as to give effect
to the contract between the drawers and the acceptors, in the
way most conveniently practicable.' ' 39
The billholders by hypothesis having no direct rights of their
own in the securities, but being merely the beneficiaries of the
means adopted to promote judicial convenience in adjusting the
equities between the two insolvent estates, it follows that up to
the moment of forced administration as applied to both estates, the
drawer and acceptor may change the purpose of the securities as
they see fit, without requiring the concurrence of the billholders." ° It
was further suggested by Lord Watson, in Royal Bank of Scotland
v. Commercial Bank of Scotland,4 that even after double bankruptcy has occurred a compromise may still be arranged between
the trustees of the respective estates, with the approval of the
court. And if, without a strict novation in the purpose of the
securities having been effected prior to bankruptcy, the acceptor
has nevertheless disposed of the securities otherwise than by their
application to the purpose of the indemnity agreement, there is
39
See also Ex parte Dever, (1885) L. R. 14 Q. B. Div. 611, 623-624
(opinion by Cotton, L. J.): "As I understand the principle of the rule
it is this-the Court finds in the hands of a bankrupt certain property,
which has been remitted to him by another person also become bankrupt
to secure him against a liability which he has undertaken upon bills drawn
upon him by that person. The property cannot be applied in paying tile
general creditors of the acceptor, because it was in his hands impressed
with a trust; nor can it go to pay the general creditors of the drawer,
because he was not entitled to have it back without meeting the acceptances.

The Court thereupon applies the property in such a way as will carry out
as far as possible the equities between the two estates, i. e., in paying the
acceptances to cover which it was sent. The rule assumes that the property which was in the hands of the acceptor is not his own absolute
property; if it was, it would go to pay his creditors generally.... ;" Bank of

Ireland v. Perry, (1871) L. R. 7 Exch. 14, 20 (opinion by Baron Cleasby) :
"Such a right is a peculiar one, for it is not founded upon any interest
the billholder has in the agreement between the drawer and acceptor; for he
has none but that which arises afterwards in consequence of the enforced
administration of the assets of both estates."
4OIn re 'General Rolling Stock Co., (1869) L. R. 4 Ch. App. Cas. 423,
429 (opinion by Selwyn, L.J.): "Until that state of circumstances has
arisen the tvo persons who are the parties to the contract have a perfect
right to deal with the securities which one of them has deposited with the
other in any manner they see fit."
41(1882) L. R. 7 App. Cas. 366, 398.
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authority to the effect that the deposit of securities for a special
purpose has been transformed into an ordinary debt owing by the
acceptor's to the drawer's estate, with the result that the "rule
of Ex parte Waring" becomes inapplicable.42 This would seem
to show that the rule has not been regarded in England as
applicable to the credit balance owing by the acceptor's to the
drawer's estate that was involved in the facts of Ex parle ff aring,
43

Inglis, Clarke itself.

If, on the other hand, it be assumed that there is a credit
balance owing by the drawer's to the acceptor's estate, which is
42
In Ex parte Dickin, (1878) L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 377, 385-386, the facts

were as follows: "Goods, the property of Pollard & Co., were sent by them
to Murrell & Crirfield for sale, under an arrangement by virtue of whic
the goods were in effect made a security to Murrell & Crisfield for the
payment of bills of exchange which they had accepted for the accommodation of Pollard & Co. After Pollard & Co. had filed their liquidation
petition Murrell & Crisfield sold the goods, for the purpose of repaying
themselves the amount of one of the bills which they had already paid,
and of providing themselves with funds to meet the other bills which were
soon to become due." Thereafter Murrell & Crisfield failed, leaving three
of the bills unpaid. In holding the "rule of Ex parte Waring" to be inapplicable, Jessell, '. R., stated: ". . . the whole of the proceeds of the
sale had been disposed of by Murrell & Crisfield before they filed their
petition. This being so, it is clear that the demand of Pollard & Co.'s
trustee against Murrell & Crisfield for the proceeds of the sale is a demand
for a debL The property of the goods is not in him. The goods are no
longer in existence as the goods of Pollard & Co. The proceeds of the
sale are gone too; they were not earmarked in any way, and at the most
the trustee's demand against Murrell & Crisfield is a demand for a debt
equal to the amount produced by the sale, less what they have paid to the
bill-holders.' In Ex parte Banner, (1875) L. Xt 2 Ch. Div. 278, the "rule
of Ex parte Waring" was held to be inapplicable where goods had been consigned by an agent to his principal, into whose hands both possession and
title had passed-for the reason that the security was gone, and only a
debt remained. And accordirig to Brett, M. R., in Ex parte Dever, (1885)
L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 611, 622,'"if the person to whom the securities are sent
does use the proceeds for his own purposes, and credits the sender with
interest upon the amount of the proceeds, and the sender does not object,
then, so far as the securities are thus used, they are taken out of the rule
of Ex parte Waring, because to that extent the security is gone."
But to the extent that by misappropriating the securities the acceptor
has committed a breach of trust as against the drawer, it would seem that
the ordinary rules as to tracing trust funds ought to be applicable, and
the "rule of Ex parte Waring" therefore also applicable to the extent that by
such rules the proceeds of the securities can still be traced in the acceptor's
general assets.
With the above icases compare In re New Zealand Banking Corporation, (1867) L. R. 4 Eq. 226, 230-231, holding the "rule of Ex parte
Waring" to be inapplicable to the extent that there is a credit balance
owing by the drawer's to the acceptor's estate, although not specifically
covered by the securitiei, and the criticism of the latter result contained
in the opinion by Cotton, L. J., in Ex parte Dever, (1885) L. R. 14 Q. B.
D. 611, 623-624; for which see below, at p. 330 of the text, notes 44-46
inclusive.
43
See above, notes 27 and 30.
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not specifically covered by the securities, the "rule, of Ex parte
Waring" has here again been held to be inapplicable. 4 This
result seems to have been based upon the proposition that the
securities have become for all purposes a part of the acceptor's
estate, to be shared by his creditors generally and by the billholders only as such. But such a result is believed to be manifestly
unsound, in that it changes the purpose of the securities, converts
an unsecured debt owed by the drawer to the acceptor into a
fully or partially secured one, and favors the general creditors of
the acceptor, other than the billholders, at the expense of the
general creditors, other than the billholders, of the drawer. It
may likewise unduly prejudice the billholders, wherever the
acceptor's estate pays smaller dividends than does the drawer's,
and the two together fail to pay the billholders in full." Such a
result cannot be sustained on any theory of the set-off of mutual
debts, for the reason that the acceptor's obligation to return to
the drawer any excess of the securities over the amount necessary
for his indemnification is much more than an ordinary unsecured
debt owing from theacceptor's to the drawer's estate. As so
aptly pointed out by Cotton, L. J., in Ex parte Dever,40
"The question is whether in the events which have happenedat the moment of the bankruptcy-the bankrupt was entitled to
apply the remitted bills which were then in his hands to any
purpose he pleased. It may well be that, so long as he is solvent,
the holder of remittances made to him in this way is, by mercantile usage or the course of dealing between the parties, entitled
to apply the proceeds of the remittances for his own benefit in
any way he pleases. But that does not show that, at the moment
when he can no longer meet his acceptances, the remitted bills,
if they remain in specie, are not subject to any equity in favor
of the drawer of the bankrupt's acceptances, enabling him to
require them to be applied in meeting the acceptances."
There is some confusion in the English cases as to the extent
of the specific appropriation necessary in order to bring the "rule
of Ex parte Waring" into operation. It was held, however, in
44n re New Zealand Banking Corporation, (1867)
L. R. 4 Eq. 226,
230-231.
45This does not assume the existence of any rights in the billholders
under the "rule of Ex parte Waring." To the extent, in the situation
hypothecated by the statement in the text, that the acceptor's estate is thus
given the benefit of the securities without having been damnified in their
full amount by dividends to the billholders, the latter, who are also
creditors of the drawer's estate, are being prejudiced along with all other
general creditors of that estate.
46(1885) L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 611, 623-624.
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City Bank v. Luckie,47 that the securities need not have been
specifically appropriated to the payment of the very bills in

question, but that it is sufficient if they have been specifically
appropriated to a general cash credit upon which such bills are
in fact drawn and accepted. And as pointed out by Cotton, L. J.,
in Ex parte Dever,'8 "if there has been a general appropriation
of securities to meet the bills drawn by A. upon B., the securities
must be applied in accordance with the rule in Ex parte Waring."'9
But the "rule of Ex porte Waring" has been said to be inapplicable where the securities have been deposited not for the purpose
of meeting the bills, or in other words for the surety's exoneration, but merely to secure the right of reimbursement for payments
made in respect of them.9 0
47(1870) L. R. 5 Ch. App. Cas. 773, 777 (opinion by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Hatherley) : "It is said, however - and this seems to have
been the view of the Vice-Chancellor in the Court below-that the
security is only for the balance of a cash account. It seems to me utterly
immaterial what is the form which the debt assumed, if, amongst other
things, you find upon investigating the account that the creditor who
claims the balance of the cash account has pledged his credit for the
purpose of having that cash advanced, which ie seeks to be paid. It is a
cash advance in whatever way it be advanced, and in effect cash was
advanced upon the security of Kynaston, Sutherland, & Co.; and Kynaston,
Sutherland, & Co. being the persons who have thus made themselves liable,
and taken this mode of advancing the money, cannot be called upon to
part with the securities until they have been completely indemnified."
48(1885) L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 611, 623.
49 But compare In re Belfast Warehouse Co., [1897] 1 Ir. Rep. Ch. Div.
124, 131-133, in which Vice-Chancellor Chatterton based his refusal to apply
the "rule of Ex parte Waring" in part upon the following grounds: "The
indemnity is general against all sums of money which should from time to
time be owing to the Company from Carmichael in account current with
the Company for or in respect of all bills theretofore or thereafter drawn by
him upon the Company, and accepted and paid, or drawn and indorsed or
otherwise secured by the Company for him, and for all cash advances, loans,
discounts, credits, advances, and payments of every description by the
Company to, or for the accommodation or at the request of, Carmichael.
The deed was, in fact, an ordinary banker's mortgage. I fail to see that
the bill-holders, now seeking to establish a lien on the mortgaged premises,
have any equity entitling them to have a sum realized on foot of this security applied specifically to their demands. Every creditor of the Company, no matter when and how his demand became payable by Carmichael.
and for which the Company became liable on their guarantees, would have
the same equity in respect thereof as the bill-holders now claim. .

.

. On

these grounds I must hold that these bill-holders have not established either
in law or in fact the right to apply the sum in question in payment of these
bills."
5OIn re New Zealand Banking Corporation, (1869) L. R. 7 Eq. 449,
454-455 (opinion by Lord Romilly, M. R.) : ". . . the securities were not
deposited to provide for the payment of the bills now in question, but of
other bills (all of which had been paid), and what should be owing on a
general account, and that the money due on the bills now in question fell
under the latter description. The case of Ex parte Waring had no application; the trustees of Lezi & Co. had no right to call on the corporation
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The "rule of Ex parte Waring" is apparently still the law of
England, although no cases applying it have been' reported since
1897."' The rule is no doubt of wider application than solely to
cases of securities specifically appropriated by the drawer to the
exoneration of the acceptor of a bill of exchange. The following
statement of the rule was made by an English text writer in
1936:52

"There seems no reason to doubt that the rule in Ex p. Waring
would apply to every case of principal and surety where the
surety is liable to the creditor for immediate unconditional payment, by whatever machinery that relation may have been constituted, if it would have been applicable had the credit been
obtained by means of accommodation acceptances. Therefore
where both principal and surety are insolvent, and their estates
under forced administration in bankruptcy or otherwise, if the
surety holds security from the principal for his indemnity against
that specified debt, and the state of affairs between the two is
such that the estate of the surety is not entitled to retain that
security after the debt guaranteed has been liquidated, nor the
estate of the principal to recover it unless that debt has been
liquidated, then the security will be applied by the court in
liquidating the debt guaranteed. This having been clone, the
creditor will be entitled to prove for the balance, as if the security
had been so applied in the first instance."
Of the "rule of Ex parte Waring" it was said by Lord Blackburn in Royal Bank of Scotland v. Commercial Bank of Scotland :

"This rule has the unquestionable advantage of being easily
worked. The objection to it is that it alters the distribution of
the estate from that which it would be if no such arbitrary rule
were introduced, which can only be justified on the ground of
to apply the securities in payment of these bills; on the contrary, the corporation were entitled to hold them as security for any balance which might
be due from Levi & Co." It affirmatively appeared, however, that there
was nothing else owing on general account by Levi & Co. than in connection 5with the unpaid bills in question.
lThe most frequently quoted statement of the "rule of Ex parte
Waring" is the one by Brett, M. R., in Ex parte Dever, (1885) L. R.
14 Q. B. D. 611, 620: "Where, as between the drawer and acceptor of a bill
of exchange, a security has, by virtue of a contract between them, been
specifically appropriated to meet that bill at maturity, and has been lodged
for that purpose by the drawer with the acceptor; then, if both drawer and
acceptor become insolvent, and their estates are brought under a forced
administration, the bill-holder, though neither party nor privy to the contract, is entitled to have the specifically appropriated security applied in or
towards payment of the bill." This statement of the rule is quoted with
approval in Eddis, The Rule of Ex parte Waring 5; and in 2 Halsbury's
Laws52 of England. 2(1 ed.. 229. note (i).
Rowlatt, The Law of Principal and Surety, 3(1 ed., 311-312.
53(1882) L. R. 7 App. Cas. 366, 392.
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necessity, or such practical inconvenience in working the administration of the estates as to amount to necessity."
Without conceding that the "rule of Ex parte Waring" is
either easily understood or easily worked, the merit of Lord
Blackburn's criticism in respect to the applica tion of the rule to
particular situations may be easily demonstrated-keeping in mind
the hypothesis upon which the rule is based, namely, that the
acceptance-holders are unsecured creditors having no direct rights
of their own in the securities, being merely the beneficiaries of
judicial convenience in the administration of the two insolvent
estates.
If it be assumed that the securities either exceed or exactly
equal the amount of the bills, and also that by proving against
both estates the billholders may receive payment in full, it is
apparent that the "rule of Ex parte Waring" in no way alters
the natural distribution of the insolvent estates or prejudices
anyone.54 Payment of the billholders out of the securities in
such a situation relieves the general creditors of both estates of
the billholders' competition in proof, and saves the acceptor's
estate from being damnified, which is all that its general creditors
are entitled to ask. On the other hand the general creditors of
the drawer's estate are prejudiced no more than they already
were by virtue of the indemnifying agreement. The intent of
that agreement has been exactly fulfilled, the same as though the
parties to it had remained solvent.
But in the above situation there is no pressing need for the
"rule of Ex parte Waring," and it is not usually determinable
in advance that the billholders may receive payment in full by
proving against both estates. And if it be assumed that the
securities either exceed or exactly equal the amount of the bills,
but that by proving against both estates the billholders will not
receive payment in full, it is now apparent that the "rule of Ex
parte Waring," although still in no way prejudicing the general
creditors of the acceptor's estate, does materially prejudice the
general creditors, other than the billholders, of the drawer's
5

4"No

doubt, the holder of the bills, if he lost the benefit of the

security, could prove on both estates; and if each paid say ten shillings in
the pound, the security being equal to the debt, the result would be the
same. But such a state of things must be uncommon; and in the majority

of cases the holder of the bills must receive an undue preference. This,
however, is the very thing which in my view of it Ex parte Waring does;
and it is of course too late to re-open the question." Porter, M. R., in
In re Richview Brickworks Co., Ltd., [1897] 1 Ir. Rep. Ch. Div. 176, 183.
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estate. For in this situation, to the extent that the amount paid
the billholders out of the securities exceeds the amount that
would have been paid to them as dividends from both estates,
the effect of the "rule of Ex parte Waring" is to give to the
billholders, who by the hypothesis of the English rule are unsecured
creditors, a preference over the other general creditors of the
drawer's estate. 5 The size of the preference will of course vary
inversely with the degree of solvency of the drawer's estate, but
it will never completely vanish until the point is reached at which
the dividends from both estates would be sufficient to pay the
billholders in full.
If it be assumed in the third place that the securities are less
than the amount of the bills, the "rule of Ex parte Waring" now
becomes prejudicial to the general creditors, other than the billholders, of both the acceptor's and the drawer's estates." For payment to the billholders of the full amount of the securities will
leave them free to prove against both estates for the unpaid
balance of their claims, 57 at the same time depriving the other

general creditors of the acceptor's estate of the benefit of the
indemnity against these obligations for which the acceptor bargained. On the other hand, the billholders may have also received
a preference over the other general creditors of the drawer's
estate, to the extent, if any, that the amount paid to them out of
the securities exceeds the amount that would have been paid to
them as dividends from both estates. In Royal Bank of Scotland
v. Commercial Bank of Scotland,"8 Lord Selborne therefore suggested that the "rule of Ex parte Waring" is practicable only in
cases where the securities are in excess of the amount of the bills,
and pointed out that Ex parte Waring, Inglis, Clarke was itself
such a case. The first application of the rule to a situation in
which the securities were less than the amount of the bills was
5
in the case of Powles v. Hargreaves,
" in 1853. The decision of
the House of Lords in the Royal Bank Case was that, in so far
as the extension of the rule in Powles v. Hargreaves "is a posi55"If the proceeds of the security are more than enough to pay the bills
the application of the rule makes no difference in the amount of the dividend
payable to the creditors of the estate who at the time of the sequestration
holds the bills .... ; but the bill-holders receive 20s. in the pound on their
bills, and are so much the better at the exclusive loss of the creditors of
the other estate." Lord Blackburn, in Royal Bank of Scotland v. Commercial Bank of Scotland. (1882) L. R. 7 App. Cas. 366, 392.
56
See above, note 54,
57
See above, note 28.
58(1882) L. R. 7 App. Cas. 366, 385-387.
19(1853) 3 De Gex, MacNaughten and Gordon. 430.
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tive rule of administration, and not the necessary result of
equitable principles, it cannot be held to be of force in Scotland
merely because it is so in England." 00
Where, the securities being less than the amount of the bills,
it turns out that the acceptor's estate alone is able to pay to the
billholders in dividends an amount in excess of the securities,
it has been held that they will be remitted to their proof, and that
the "rule of Ex parte Waring" becomes inapplicable.0 ' This is
merely to hold that-where the acceptor's right of indemnity out
of the securities is thus readily ascertainable, and exceeds the
amount of the securities, such right will receive preference in
accordance with the indemnity agreement, and the securities therefore become general assets of the acceptor's estate. But the same
result has been said to follow wherever, the securities being less
than the amount of the bills, it turns out that the two estates together are able to pay to the billholders in dividends an amount
in excess of the securities.62 As a general proposition, however,
this is believed unduly to favor the general creditors of the
acceptor's estate at the expense of the general creditors of the
drawer's estate, to whatever extent the acceptor's estate has not
60(1882) L. R. 7 App. Cas. 366, 387.
6In re Belfast Warehouse Co., [1897] 1 Ir. Rep. Ch. Div. 124, 133
(opinion by Vice-Chancellor Chatterton) : "The assets of the Company have
already paid over 1900 pounds to these bill-holders on foot of the guaranty
for Carmichael's bills, and will immediately pay a like amount. These
payments will exceed the amount of the proceeds of the mortgaged premises,
and as the 3500 pounds was properly applicable in the first place to repay to
the assets of the Company the sums paid on foot of Carmichael's bills
guaranteed by them, that sum must now be dealt with as assets of the
Company for the discharge of its liabilities, and I direct the liquidator to
so apply
62 it."
See In re Joint Stock Discount Co., (1868) L R. 6 Eq. 491. The
Joint Stock Discount Company had guaranteed 35,000 pounds in bills accepted by the Contract Corporation, and had taken from the latter an
assignment of the securities that it held for the payment of the bills.
Both companies being in prociss of winding up, the billholders, who had
no notice of the securities, proved against both estates for the full amount
of their claims, and thereby recovered £21,000 from the Joint Stock Discount Company, and £520 from the Contract Corporation. Thereafter
the securities produced £23,500. It was held that the proceeds belonged
entirely to the estate of the Joint Stock Discount Company, and were
divisible among all its creditors, including the billholders, in dividends.
But. it is believed that the above result cannot be justified as to the
difference of 2,500 pounds between the proceeds of the securities and the
amount of the Joint Stock Discount Company's original damnification, except to the extent that such excess would be absorbed by further damnification of the Joint Stock Discount Company through repeated dividends to
the billholders, as under the Scottish rule, for which see below, pp. 336-338
of the text. The English court was not consciously applying the Scottish
rule, however, but was purporting to introduce an entirely arbitrary exception to the "rule of Ex parte Waring."
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in fact been damnified in the full extent of the securities. The
English court was not consciously applying the Scottish rule,
presently to be considered, under which, in similar circumstances, the extent of the surety's damnification would not be
restricted to the amount of the dividends declared to the billholders from his other assets, but instead was purporting to
introduce a purely arbitrary exception to the "rule of Ex parte
Waring." The result, it is submitted, may become worse than
that which the application of the rule to such a situation would
produce-since the billholders, who would be favored by the
application of the rule, are at least creditors of the drawer's estate,
to which the securities in excess of the amount necessary to
indemnify the acceptor's estate are supposed to belong, whereas
the other general creditors of the acceptor may not normally be
assumed to be creditors of both estates, as are the billholders.
The smaller the contribution of the acceptor's estate to the dividends that from both estates exceed the amount of the securities,
the greater becomes the prejudice to the general creditors of the
drawer's estate, including the billholders, that may result from
the non-application in this situation of the "rule of E.r parle
Waring."
Such vagaries in the application of the "rule of Ex parte
Waring," together with the possibilities of prejudice and tinnatural devolution inherent in the rule itself, led the House of
Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v. Commercial Bank of Scotland63 to sustain a different rule in its application to Scotland. In
this case the Royal Bank was the holder of £ 16.000 of bills drawn
by Ramsay and accepted by Saunders upon the security of goods
belonging to Ramsay in Saunders' hands, which at the date of
63(1882)

L. R. 7 App. Cas. 366.

Other cases also have expressed

dissatisfaction with the "rule of Ex parte Waring."

See the statement

by Porter, M. R., in In re Richview Brickworks Co., Ltd., [1897] 1 Ir. Rep.
Ch. Div. 176, 183: "I confess for myself that with all the deference which
a lawyer must feel for the considered view of so great a master as Lord
Eldon, I have always been unable to see the necessity or the justice or even
the expediency of any such rule as that in Ex parte Waring at all. The
holder of the bills has by contract no right to the benefit of the security.

That is conceded on all hands, and expressly recognized or decided by
Lord Eldon in the leading case. He is, apart from bankruptcy (or its
equivalent)

simply an unsecured creditor.

Why, when bankruptcy super-

venes, he should be converted into a secured creditor, and so obtain a
preference over other creditors equally meritorious with himself, it is hard
to understand. No doubt the rule in question is simple and saves trouble in
some cases. It seems, however, to be root and branch opposed to the
principles now regarded in distributing the assets of bankrupt estates. It
is the law, however, in England and in Ireland."
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double bankruptcy amounted to approximately £4,000, the amount
for which they were later sold. The Commercial Bank was the
holder of approximately E10,000 of bills drawn by Saunders and
accepted by Ramsay without security, and as such was resisting the
appropriation of the proceeds of Ramsay's goods in Saunders'
hands to the exclusive benefit of the Royal Bank. The Court of
Session, rejecting the "rule of Ex parte Waring,"" proceeded
upon the theory that Ramsay's goods in Saunders' hands were an
asset of a peculiar nature in Saunders' estate, unavailable for
dividends until damnification had occurred in the form of dividends
already declared in favor of the billholders from the other assets
of Saunders' estate, but thereupon ripening to that extent into an
asset for general distribution.
-In its application the Scottish rule proceeds by first declaring
dividends from the acceptor's general assets not including the
securities, in which dividends the billholders share as general
creditors of the acceptor's estate. To the extent that the billholders
share in such dividends, the securities become available for the
declaration of a further dividend, in which the billholders again
share as general creditors. The process is continued until either
the securities are exhausted or the last possibility of damnification
to the acceptor's estate has been eliminated, whichever occurs first.
The elimination of risk to the acceptor's estate would in turn be
accomplished at either of two points, whichever occurs first: (1)
the point at which the billholders will have received payment in
full in dividends from both estates; or (2) the point at which
the other creditors of the acceptor's estate will have received in
dividends an amount equal to that to which they would have been
entitled out of the acceptor's -separate assets without the competition of the billholders, which is all to which they are entitled
by virtue of the indemnity agreement. The second point may be
reached rather quickly in cases in which the acceptor's general
assets are small.
Any excess of the securities remaining after either point is
reached is of course restored to the drawer's estate. To the extent
that by dividends paid to .the billholders the acceptor's estate is
damnified in excess of the amount of the securities, it of course
retains an unsecured claim for reimbursement igainst the drawer's estate. Wherever, the securities being less than the amount
64In affirming, the House of Lords was somewhat influenced by the
fact that the securities involved were less than the amount of the bills. See
above, p. 334 of the text.
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of the bills, it turns out that the acceptor's estate alone will be
able to pay in dividends to the billholders an amount in excess of
the securities, it should follow, under the Scottish rule as much
as under the "rule of Ex parte Waring," that the securities have
become in all respects general assets of the acceptor's estate."8
Conversely, where it would take the dividends to the billholders
from both estates to equal the amount of the securities, that result
would have no more basis under the Scottish rule than under the
"rule of Ex parte Waring," except to the extent that the excess
of the securities over the amount of the acceptor's damnification
through dividends declared to the billholders from his other
assets would be absorbed by the repetitive process of the Scottish
rule. 68
The Scottish rule has received the strong approbation of at
least one American commentator,"7 although it has acquired no
following in this country. Accepting the hypothesis upon which
both the Scottish rule and the "rule of Ex parte Waring" are
based, namely, that no direct rights accrue by operation of law
or equity to creditors in their sureties' securities, it would seem
to follow that the Scottish rule accomplishes a more natural division of the securities, in fuller accord with the assumed intent of
the parties, than does the "rule of Ex parte Waring;" and that
in a practical manner it resolves by lapse of time an impasse that
the English courts apparently thought insoluble. Taking again
as the premise of both rules that no direct rights would exist in
the creditor in the absence of the forced administration of both
estates, the only criticism that can be directed at the Scottish rule
would seem to be that it does not accomplish the surety's exoneration-a purpose as much within the intent of the usual indemnity
agreemeiit as is his reimbursement. 8 To the extent of the realiza65
See
66

above. p. 335 of the text.
See above, pp. 335-336 of the text, note 62.
7See Williams, A Creditor's Right to His Surety's Securities, (1888)
1 Hary. L. Rev. 326, 337.
6
8See Chambers v. Prewitt, (1898) 172 Ill. 615, 620, 50 N. E. 145, 146;
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Trimble, (1878) 51 Md. 99, 113-114; O'Neill v.
State Savings Bank, (1906) 34 Mont. 521, 87 Pac. 970, 971; Merchants &
Manufacturers' Nat'l Bank v. Cumings, (1896) 149 N. Y. 360, 364-365, 44
N. E. 173, 174; Matthews v. Joyce, (1881) 85 N. C. 258, 266; HendersonAchert Lithographic Co. v. John Shillito Co., (1901) 64 Ohio St. 236. 250.
60 N. E. 295, 297; Breedlove v. Stump, (1830) 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 257, 263:
Hauser v. King, (1882) 76 Va. 731, 733-734. That the securities are for
the purpose of the surety's exoneration as well as his reimbursement is
of course presupposed by the "rule of Ex parte Waring." See the cases
cited in notes 22 and 50, above. That the purpose of the securities will
be more strictly construed in favor of third-party indemnitors than in the
6
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ble value of the securities the "rule of Ex parte Waring" does
accomplish the purpose of the surety's exoneration-at the sacrifice, however, of his security for the right of reimbursement wherever the exhaustion of the securities leaves the surety's estate
still liable for the deficiency. As between the two purposes of
the securities, it should be obvious that the surety and his other
creditors would much prefer that the purpose of exoneration be
sacrificed, if either needs be sacrificed. The forced judicial administration of the estates of both" the principal debtor and the
surety frequently makes such a choice necessary. Still keeping
in mind the premise upon which both rules are based, it would
seem that the Scottish rule makes the sounder choice, and is
preferable to the "rule of Ex parte Waring." Attention is turned
in the next-section to the American cases, which more or less
articulately proceed upon a different premise, requiring a different
rationalization.
II.

THE AmERICAN CASES

The doctrine attributed to Maure v. Harrison was set forth in
the first American edition of Bacon's New Abridgment of the
Law, 69 published in 1811, and received its first American application from Chancellor Kent in the case of Moses v. Murgalroyd,10
decided in 1814, a year before the decision in Ex parle Waring,
Inglis, Clarke in England. In that case the defendant's testator
had indorsed notes for one Ogden, and had subsequently received
securities from Ogden as indemnity against his indorsements. 11
The securities were not specifically found to have been appropriated
to the payment of the principal debt as distinguished from the
purpose of merely personal indemnity to the indorser.7 No such
case of securities provided by the principal debtor, see O'Neill v. State
Savings Bank and Henderson-Achert Lithographic Co. v. John Shillito
Co., both cited above in this note.
695 Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law, 1st Am. cd., Title Obligations, D (4).
70(1814) 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 119.
7
'The securities had been given by way of absolute assignment, but
parol evidence was admitted to show that they were intended for indemnity
purposes only. For the extent to which other cases have admitted parol
evidence to show the purpose of securities held by the surety, see below,
text at notes 85-88 inclusive.
72But see Scott, The Creditor's Right to Subject the Securities of the
Surety When They Purport to be for Indemnity Merely, (1885) 19 Am. L
author bases a different interpretation of the
Rev. 867, 873, wherea"
.
Itnesses set forth at 124-125 of 1 Johns. Ch.,
case upon the testimor
- court in denying a petition for rehearing at
and upon the language
476 of 1 Johns. Ch. In the .inion, however, at pp. 128-129 of 1 Johns. Ch.,
C'-ancellor Kent accepted the testimony of the witness Ogden that he had
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distinction was suggested as being of significance. Nor did it
appear that the defendant's testator was insolvent, and apparently
no significance was attached by the chancellor to the fact of
Ogden's insolvency. In holding that the note holders were
entitled to have the securities applied for their benefit, Chancellor
Kent cited Maure v. Harrisonand added:
"These collateral securities are, in fact, trusts created for the
better protection of the debt; and it is the duty of this court to
see that they fulfil the design. And whether the plaintiffs were
apprized, at the time, of the creation of this security, is not material.
The trust was created for their benefit, or for the better security
of their debt, and when it came to their knowledge, they were
entitled to affirm the trust, and to enforce its performance."" 3
It has been said that "It may be safely asserted that the whole
doctrine of the creditor's equitable trust lien upon the securities
given the surety for his indemnity had its foundation in Moses v.
Murgatroyd."74 Chancellor Kent gave still further currency to
such a doctrine by stating in his Commentaries:
"Collateral securities given by a debtor to his surety, are
considered as trusts for the better security of the creditor's debt:
and chancery will see that their intention be fulfilled.""
Story, on the other hand, states the proposition of Maure v.
Harrison not so much as a trust principle as an aspect of the
doctrines of subrogation and marshalling." Maiure v. Harrison
has been cited without challenge or analytical discussion through
fourteen successive editions of Story.
Upon either the trust or the subrogation theory, or upon a more
made the assignment "to indemnify S. Murgatroyd against the endorsement of
the notes in question," . . . "for that specific purpose, and for no other," and
prefaced the statement quoted below in the text with the finding "that the
assignment . . . was intended, by the parties to it, to be a security only to
the intestate for his endorsement of the notes in question."
73(1814) 1 Johns. Ch. 119, 129.
7
4Willard, Right of a Creditor to his Sureties' Securities, (1880) 14
Am. L. Rev. 839, 845.
754 Kent, Commentaries on American Law, Ist ed., 307; 8th ed., 321322; 12th ed. by 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 308.
762 Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 14th ed., 123 (in
section on subrogation): "On the other hand if a surety has a counter
bond or security from the principal, the creditor will be entitled to the
benefit of it, and may in equity reach such security to satisfy his debt;"
2 Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 14th ed., 240 (in section
on marshalling): "And on the other hand if the principal has given any
securities or other pledges to his surety, the creditor is entitled to all the
benefit of such securities or pledges in the hands of the surety, to be applied
in payment of his debt." Both quotations are in the original text of
Story. See also Story, Commentaries on the Law of Promissory Notes,
4th ed., 337-338.
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general appeal to the requirements of natural equity judicially
interpreted, the American cases are unanimous in according to
creditors certain rights, at least under some circumstances, in
their sureties' securities. The conditioning circumstances and
extent of such rights depend to a very considerable extent upon
the theory applied.
A. Where the Securities Are for the Payment of the Principal Debt.-According to one commentator a source of much
confusion in the American cases has been "the neglect of a clear
distinction between securities given directly for the payment of
the debt, and those given purely for the indemnity of the surety,
with the consequent uncertainty as to the rights or obligations
derived from these respectively; . . . because exactly similar

instruments have been regarded
by different courts as falling
77
under each of these classes."
But assuming for the time being that the securities in question
are found to have been deposited with the surety for the express
purpose of payment of the principal obligation, the American
cases are practically unanimous both in according the maximum
rights in the securities to the creditor, and in placing the result upon
Chancellor Kent's trust theory.78 To the extent that in such
cases the courts have also used the language of subrogation, it
has not affected the result achieved. In a few such cases the
trust result has been reached in third-party-beneficiary contractual
language.79 In emphasizing the importance of the securities having
77
Willard, Right of a Creditor to His Sureties' Securities, (1880) 14
Am.78L. Rev. 839, 840.
Magill v. Brown, (1899) 20 Tex. Civ. App. 662, 674, S0 S. W. 143,
149 : ... there appears to be practical unanimity of authority upon the
proposition that when the principal debtor has provided a fund in the hands
or subject to the control of the surety for the payment of the debt, ...
the creditor can claim the benefit of such contract, foreclose the lien thereby
created, and have the property applied to the payment of his debt
Property thus placed under the control of the surety is impressed with a
trust in favor of the creditor; . . .;" Morrill v. Morrill, (1880) 53 Vt.
74, 80, 38 Am. Rep. 659, 660; "Where it is given as security for the debt
as well as indemnity, there would seem to be little doubt that the creditor,
whether cognizant of the assignment and its purpose or not at the time of
the assignment, could, when it came to his knowledge, avail himself of it
as effectually, on maturity of his debt, as he could, had it been assigned
to him directly" (but the court here reached the same result in the case
of merely indemnifying securities); Johnson v. Martin, (1915) 83 Wash.
364, 368, 145 Pac. 429, 430: "The only thing standing in the way of the
due execution of the contract is a competent trustee. It is a primary rule
that 7equity
will not permit a trust to fail for the want of a trustee."
9

See Continental State Bank of Beckville v. Reed, (Tex. Civ. App.,
1926) 284 S. W. 265, 267, reversed, in favor of the creditor, in Reed v.
Continental State Bank of Beckville, (Tex., 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 426:
"When a deposit is made with the surety on an obligation for the express
purpose of securing the same, as well as the surety, the creditor holding
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been specifically appropriated to the payment of the principal
obligation, as distinguished from the more restricted purpose of
merely personal indemnity to the surety, the courts for the most
part have assumed that the question is entirely one of the intent
of the parties to the security agreement. According to Dean
Arant, "That an interest in the creditor should be recognized,
when the security is given for the expressed purpose of paying the
debt due him, is not questionable."'8 0
In determining whether the securities have been specifically
appropriated to the payment of the principal obligation, as distinguished from the more restricted purpose of merely personal
indemnity to the surety, the courts will look to all the terms of
the security instrument.- Whether there can be said to be a
such obligation has upon acceptance a contractual right to have it so
applied." In Louisiana the giving of securities to the surety for the payment of the principal debt is said to be in the nature of a "stipulation
pour autrui" in favor of the creditor, see King v. Harman's Heirs, (1834)
6 La. 607, 618, 26 Am. Dec. 485, 487. To the extent that a trust for the
creditor's benefit in securities held by the surety for the payment of the
principal debt is recognized in Mississippi, it is placed upon a rather strict
contractual basis, see Osborn v. Noble, (1872) 46 Miss. 449, 454; but in
Carpenter v. Bowen, (1868) 42 Miss. 28, a result was reached that is
entirely inconsistent with a contractual basis of the creditor's right. In
that case the creditor was seeking to levy execution against the principal
debtor's equity of redemption in property mortgaged by him to the surety
for the payment of the debt. The court refused to allow him to do so,
holding at 42 Miss. 53-54 that "To allow a sale of the equity of redemption
upon legal process, emanating from a judgment for the debt secured by
mortgage or deed of trust, would be in contravention of the contract of the
parties, as understood in a court of equity, by which the debtor had a
right to redeem. And the court will not allow him to be deprived of
that right in this summary way. . . . If the creditor is not satisfied with
his security, he may resort to other property of his debtor; but against the
estate on which he has taken a security, he ought not to act, but upon
the footing of that security, and according to its terms, in their established
sense." But since the creditor did not control or in any way participate in
the taking of the security by the surety, it is rather hard to justify the
result reached by the court on contractual grounds, as it apparently sought
to do. No other cases upholding the creditor's right upon the trust principle go so far as to preclude his disaffirmance of it.
8
OArant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 371.
8
'King v. Harman's Heirs, (1834) 6 La. 607,, 617-618, 26 Am. Dec. 485,
486-487; Osborn v. Noble, (1872) 46 Miss. 449,'454; Cooper v. Middleton, (1886) 94 N. C. 86, 95.
In Forrest's Executors v. Luddington, (1880) 68 Ala. 1, 6, 14, the
security had been taken by the state of Alabama against its guaranty of
railroad bonds, and in holding a trust for the creditors' benefit to have
arisen the court looked also to the terms of the statute requiring the taking
of the security, which provided that it should stand "for the payment of
all of said bonds indorsed for the company as provided in this act, and
for the interest accruing on said bonds." The court recognized that had the
state exercised its own rights by taking possession of the security, the
relief asked by the creditors would have been impossible, so long as the
state was not and could not be made a party. But the state had disclaimed
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presumption of intent one way or the other is doubtful. In
Chambers v. Prewitt,8 2 the supreme court of Illinois stressed the
absence of words expressly limiting the purpose of the securities
to the surety's personal indemnity as a factor of significance in
construing them to have been given for the payment of the principal obligation; but in Osborn v. Noble, 83 the supreme court of
Mississippi asseited the stricter and-if the question is entirely
one of the intent of the parties to the security agreement-more
logical rule that
"Where the conveyance is made to or for the security [surety?]
of property not by the terms of the instrument specifically bound
to the creditor, the primary intent apparent on the face of the
'
1
writing is that the property is not pledged to him for the debt."'
Parol evidence is held to be admissible to show a deed to the surety,
absolute on its face, to have been intended nevertheless for the
security of a particular debt for which the surety was liable on
behalf of the principal debtor ;85 to show that the securities were
all liability upon the bonds and all interest in the security, and the court
held that "Not asserting any rights, and disclaiming all liability, does not
revoke, or extinguish, or destroy the trust fastened by the statute for the
payment of the bonds. The failure or refusal of the state to execute, or aid
in the execution of the trust, is only an additional reason for the interference of a court of equity, which will not suffer trusts to fail for the want
of a trustee to execute them, or because the trustee refuses to recognize
them. When a state has rights and interests commingled with the rights and
interests of individuals, and cannot be made a party to a litigation springing
out of them, the jurisdiction of courts is not suspended. If, as in the
present case, no decree or judgment is sought against the state, the
freedom from suit attaching to her sovereignty is a sufficient reason for
dispensing with her presence." But compare Branch v. Macon & B. R. Co.,
(C.C. S.D. Ga., 1875) 2 Woods 385, Fed. Cas. No. 1808, in which the
federal court was influenced to refuse relief to the creditors upon somewhat similar facts, for the reason that the surety was the state of Georgia,
beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
82(1898) 172 Ill. 615, 623, 50 N. E. 145, 147. See also Forrest's
Executors v. Luddington, (1880) 68 Ala. 1, 12.
83(1872) 46 Miss. 449, 454.
84At 46 Miss. 454, 458, the court continued: "The owner has a right
(if he does no fraud, or violates no prohibition of law) to dispose of his
property at pleasure. Courts efiforce contracts, or give redress for the
violation of them, as made by the parties. By construction, they cannot en-

large them beyond their fair intent and meaning, nor, on the other hand.
so limit them as to fall short of that. . . . The decisions in this court
have, with more dearness than elsewhere, observed the distinction between
a security given to a surety, to save him against loss from being compelled
to pay, or doing so voluntarily, and those which, while providing for that,
affix to the property a trust for the payment of the debt, in such wise as
that it is designed to be also a security for the debt."
85
Moses v. Murgatroyd, (1814) 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 119, 128; Seibert
v. True, (1871) 8 Kan. 52, 60. This is of course entirely in accord with
a familiar exception to the parol evidence rule. See 4 Wigmore. Evidence,
3435-3437.
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given for the payment of the principal debt as distinguished from
merely personal indemnity to the surety;8 and to show which
creditors are entitled to share in the proceeds of the securities ;8T
but not, according to the court of civil appeals of Texas, so as to
vitiate the trust effect of an instrument construed on its face to
have been given for the payment of the principal debt. 88
Where the securities have not by clear language been specifically
appropriated to the payment of the principal debt, the chief factors
that the courts have emphasized in finding nevertheless that this
was their purpose rather than merely personal indemnity to the
surety, are (1) the fact that the security instrument is conditioned
upon the payment by the principal debtor of the principal obligation at its maturity ;89 or (2) that it is conditioned to be void
8
6Chambers v. Prewitt, (1898) 172 Il1. 615, 621-622, 50 N. E. 145, 147;
Dowell v. Woodsides, (1894) 16 Ky. L. Rep. 325, 27 S. W. 853; Albion
State Bank v. Knickerbocker, (1900) 125 Mich. 311, 315-316, 84 N. W. 311,
312-313.
87Albion State Bank v. Knickerbocker, (1900) 125 Mich. 311, 315-316,
84 N. W. 311, 312-313. In this case the written instrument provided "that
this mortgage is given to the said party of the second part to indemnify
and secure him against all notes and obligations made by said William B.
Knickerbocker, and indorsed by said party of the second part or signed

by him, as accommodation maker or otherwise ....

such notes and obliga-

tions amounting to said sum of $31,500." The surety was in fact liable
for the principal debtor upon notes totalling $48,500. Parol evidence was
permitted not only to show that the security was intended for the payment
of the notes, but also to show that it was intended for the payment of
three particular notes, totalling $31,500, of which the complainants' was one.
See also Seibert v. True, (1871) 8 Kan. 52, 60; Chambers v. Prewitt,
(1898)88 172 Ill. 615, 623, 50 N. E. 145, 147.
Magill v. Brown, (1899) 20 Tex. Civ. App. 662, 675, 50 S. W. 143,
150: "The purpose to provide a fund for the payment of appellees' debt
being clearly shown by the certain and unambiguous terms of the trust
deed executed June 6, 1894, parol evidence was not admissible to show that
the intention of the parties was otherwise; . . ."

The "clear and un-

ambiguous terms" of the security instrument had authorized the sale by
the surety of the security "for the purpose, among others, of paying
appellees' debt." But in Morrill v. Morrill, (1880) 53 Vt. 74, 79, 38 Am.
Rep. 659, the court said that "The true character of this mortgage may be
shown, notwithstanding it purports to be given as security for a promissory
note. It may be shown that it was given for indemnity only." The court
refused, however, to attribute any legal significance to the distinction.
89
Durham v. Craig, (1881) 79 Ind. 117, 121: "Where property is mortgaged to a surety, and the condition of the mortgage is that the mortgagor
will pay the note which the surety has signed and indemnify the surety,
the mortgage and mortgaged property are held in trust for the creditor
and for the payment of the debt, and the creditor has a right in equity to
have the property applied to the payment of the debt." See also Forrest's
Executors v. Luddington, (1880) 68 Ala. 1, 12-13; Daniel v. Hunt, (1884)
77 Ala. 567, 570; Eastman v. Foster, (1844) 8 Metc. (Mass.) 19, 23:
Demott v. Stockton Paper Ware Mfg. Co., (1880) 32 N. J. Eq. 124, 131:
People v. Metropolitan Surety Co., (1911) 148 App. Div. 503, 132 N. Y. S.
829, 831; Paris v. Hulett, (1854) 26 Vt. 308, 312.
But compare First Congregational Society in Becket v. Snow, (1848) 1
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upon payment by him;9° or (3) that it contains an express
agreement by him to perform the principal obligation;", or (4)
the fact that the securities have been expressed to be for the
exoneration of the surety as well as his reimbursement;92 or (5)
what amounts to the same thing, the existence in the surety of a
power of sale or other power to realize upon the securities upon
nonpayment by the principal debtor of the principal obligation at
its maturity, in advance of actual payment by the surety ;93 or (6)
Cush. (Mass.) 510, 518; Bibb v. Martin, (1850) 14 Smedes & Marshall
(Miss.)
87; Miller & Stiger v. Wack, (1831) 1 N. J. Eq. 204, 208.
90
Carpenter v. Bowen, (1868) 42 Miss. 28, 54: "The conveyance was
intended not only to indemnify Lum against his liabilities as surety for
Forbes, but manifestly to secure the payment of the debts therein specified.
It was to be void on the condition that the notes and liabilities therein
mentioned were paid at maturity, otherwise not." See also Durham v.
Craig, (1881) 79 Ind. 117, 120-121; Plaut v. Storey, (1891) 131 Ind. 46.
48, 30 N. E. 886-887; Moore v. Moberly, (1847) 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 299,
300-301; Cooper v. Middleton, (1886) 94 N. C. 86, 94-95; Saylors v.
Saylors, (1871) 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 525, 530; Brown & Heywood Co. v.
Ligon, (C.C. Mo. 1899) 92 Fed. 851, 855-856.
But compare Dyer v. Jacoway, (1905) 76 Ark. 171, 88 S. W. 901;
Jones v. The Quinnipiack Bank, (1860) 29 Conn. 25; Thompson v. White.
(1881) 48 Conn. 509; Bibb v. Martin, (1850) 14 Smedes & Marshall (Miss.)
87; Bush v. Stamps, (1853) 26 Miss. 463; Pool v. Doster, (1881) 59
Miss. 258; Fagan v. Thompson, (C.C. Mo. 1889) 38 Fed. 467.
"'Griffis v. First Nat'1 Bank of Connersville, (1907) 168 Ind. 546, 552,
81 N. E. 490, 492: "The general rule with respect to indemnity mortgages
is that, where the instrument contains a promise to pay the obligations for
which the mortgagee is liable as surety, the mortgage creates a trust, and an
equitable lien for the full benefit of the principal creditor." See also Durham
v. Craig, (1881) 79 Ind. 117, 121-122.
92Merchants & Manufacturers' Nat'l Bank v. Cumings, (1896) 149
N. Y. 360, 364-365, 44 N. E. 173, 174: "It turns upon a distinction between a contract to indemnify against liability, and a contract to indemnify
against damage resulting from a liability... mere liability, without more,
is not damage within the distinction mentioned." In this case John
Cumings had indorsed the note of Joseph Cumings and had taken "as
collateral security for his indorsement" a note of Joseph Cumings indorsed
by Ira Cumings, in the same amount and payable on the same day as the
first note. The second note was held to be for the exoneration of John
Cumings against all liability on the first note, for the following reasons:
(1) that John Cumings had refused to assume liability on the first note
until the second was given; (2) that the second was payable on the same
day as the first, in the same amount; and (3) that the second note recited
it was given as collateral security for the indorsement of the first. The
holder of the first note was therefore held to be entitled to enforce the
second for its own benefit, although John Cumings had as yet paid nothing
on the first.
93Smith v. Gillam, (1886) 80 Ala. 296, 299: "The nature of this security
does not admit of any doubt. It is not only one of indemnity to the surety,
but it was given to secure the debt. It provides that the mortgagee may
sell the lands conveyed in the event of the mortgagor's failure or refusal
to pay the mortgage debt. A trust fund was thus created for the payment
of the debt, to the benefit of which the creditor was entitled, by way of
subrogation, whether the surety was actually damnified or not." See also
Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ledyard, (1846) 8 Ala. 866, 872; Branch
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the specification in the security instrument of the particular debt
on which, or creditor to whom, the surety is liable on behalf of
the principal debtor. 4
It is believed that the emphasis upon such provisions of the
security instrument as indicative of intent is but reasoning by
fiction toward a result desired by the courts from other motives."5
Bank at Mobile v. Robertson, (1851) 19 Ala. 798, 801-802; Cullum v.
Branch Bank at Mobile, (1853) 23 Ala. 797, 799-800; Daniel v. Hunt,
(1884) 77 Ala. 567, 570; Cooper v. Middleton, (1886) 94 N. C. 86, 94-95;
Magill v. Brown, (1899) 20 Tex. Civ. App. 662, 675, 50 S. W. 143, 150.
But compare Bush v. Stamps, (1853) 26 Miss. 463; Osborn v. Noble,
(1872) 46 Miss. 449; Clay v. Freeman, (1896) 74 Miss. 816, 20 So. 871;
Williams v. Gallick, (1884) 11 Or. 337, 3 Pac. 469; Branch v. Macon & B.

R. Co.,
(C.C. Ga. 1875) 2 Woods 385, Fed. Cas. No. 1,808.
94

1n Ten Eyck & Brinckerhoff v. Holmes, (1846)
3 Sandf. Ch. (N.Y.)
428, 430, complainants held the notes of one Wilber, indorsed by Holmes.
They secured a judgment therefor against Holmes, who thereafter, having also a demand of his own against Wilber for $857, obtained from him
a bond and mortgage for $1,350, "of which $500 was inserted to secure

him on his indorsement of the above notes, and $850 for his own demand."

Holmes assigned the mortgage for the benefit of his own creditors. Conplainants were held entitled to priority out of the proceeds of the mortgaged property, the court finding that "the terms of payment, placing the
$500 first in order, leads to the inference that the parties actually had in
view, the effect which the law attaches to the transaction, viz.: the discharge of the complainants' debt out of the first moneys received on the
mortgage."
But compare First Congregational Society in Becket v. Snow, (1848)
1 Cush. (Mass.) 510, 518, where Adams, who owed Snow $71 and the
plaintiff $329 for which Snow was surety, gave to Snow a mortgage conditioned "that Adams should pay the note for $329, on which Snow was
surety, to the plaintiffs, and the note for $71, to Snow." The court held:
"Certainly there was no express trust; it was a mortgage from Adams to
Snow to secure him a debt of $71, and to indemnify him against his
liability as surety on the note, in virtue of which the complainants now
seek to charge the land. Such a trust is not necessarily implied from the
fact of giving the mortgage, and it is expressly denied by the answer ...
How can anybody, having a mere equitable lien or claim, take the
property out of the hands of one who has an equity, accompanied by the legal
title, 95in any other mode than by redeeming?"
But see Scott, The Creditor's Right to Subject the Securities of the
Surety When They Purport to be for Indemnity Merely, (1885) 19 Am.
L. Rev. 867, 869-870: "When the instrument of indemnity is conditioned that
the maker of the indemnity shall pay the debt, and in every way save the
surety from all trouble and expense; or that the debt is to be paid out of
the proceeds; or that the indemnity is to be void in case the maker pays
the debt, and if he fails that the indemnity shall be enforced; we think the
better doctrine is that the intent to secure the debt itself should be held to
exist, even although the only expressed purpose be the personal protection of
the surety."
In Eastman v. Foster, (1844) 8 Metc. (Mass.) 19, 28-29. one of the
cases finding a trust for the creditor's benefit on the basis of the securities
being conditioned for the payment of the principal debt, the court expressly
emphasized, however, that "The original and primary object of taking
the securities was to indemnify the surety:" and for that reason the court
protected the surety to the extent of giving priority out of the proceeds of
the securities to the only note upon which the surety was still liable. the
period of limitations having run in his favor upon all the others.
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For without such express provisions of the first two types mentioned above, and under a security instrument restricted in the
clearest terms to the surety's indemnification, the right of the
surety to realize upon the securities is ordinarily subject to the
condition precedent of the nonpayment by the principal debtor of
the principal obligation at its maturity, and to the resolutory condition of payment by him, in which event the surety's legal title
to the securities will become at least voidable. Nor does the
principal debtor's promise in the security instrument to perform
the principal obligation add anything to the liability which by
hypothesis he has already incurred.
Furthermore, since the obligation already incurred by the
principal debtor includes by legal implication the surety's exoneration, except as specifically negatived by the contract between them,
it follows that even in the absence of express provisions of the
fourth and fifth types mentioned above, securities furnished to the
surety by the principal debtor will normally be construed to have
been given for the surety's exoneration as well as his reimbursement, so that he may realize upon them as soon as he has been
damnified by his liability having become absolute through the
nonpayment by the principal debtor of the principal obligation at
its maturity, and may use the proceeds to pay the creditor."
Finally, the specification in the security instrument of the particular
debt on which, or creditor to whom, the surety is liable on behalf
98

0'Neill v. State Savings Bank, (1906) 34 Mont. 521, 87 Pac. 970, 971:

"The rule rests upon the principle of natural equity, which requires that
property, in whatever form it may be, of him who is primarily liable for
the payment of the debt shall be applied to the payment of the debt to the
exoneration of one who is only secondarily liable." See also Chambers
v. Prewitt, (1898) 172 Ill. 615, 620, 50 N. E. 145, 146; Baltimore & 0. R. Co.
v. Trimble, (1878) 51 Md. 99, 113-114; Merchants & Manufacturers' Nat'l
Bank v. Cumings, (1896) 149 N. Y. 360, 364-365, 44 N. E. 173, 174;
Matthews v. Joyce, (1881) 85 N. C. 258, 266; Henderson-Achert Lithographic Co. v. John Shillito Co., (1901) 64 Ohio St. 236, 250, 60 N. E. 295,
297; Breedlove v. Stump, (1830) 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 257, 263; Hauser v.
King, (1882) 76 Va. 731, 733-734. Since the surety's right of exoneration
arises by legal implication, even in the absence of an express provision
therefor, it ought to follow that the indemnifying securities, the same as all
other property of'the principal debtor, may be made to answer that purpose, except to the extent that the right of exoneration is entirely precluded
by the contract between the parties. But since the surety's right of exoneration
from a third-party indemnitor does not arise by legal implication, the
purpose of indemnifying securities will naturally be construed more strictly
in favor of third-party indemnitors than in the case of securities provided
by the principal debtor. See O'Neill v. State Savings Bank and HendersonAchert Lithographic Co. v. John Shillito Co., both cited above in this note;
and see also Clay v. Freeman, (1896) 74 Miss. 816, 20 So. 871; Hasbrouck
v. Carr, (1914) 19 N. M. 586. 145 Pac. 133; Morgan v. Francklyn and
Butler, (1873) 55 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 244.
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of the principal debtor is in no way to be deemed an expression
of intent inconsistent with the securities being restricted in their
purpose to the surety's personal indemnification; for it is but
perfectly natural that the security instrument should in every
case specify with particularity that against which the surety is
indemnified.
The fictitious character of these factors upon which so many
American courts have found an intent specifically to appropriate
the securities to the payment of the principal indebtedness will
become of further significance in discussing the cases that reach
9
the trust result even in the absence of such factors. 7 The two
groups of cases are thus brought onto more common ground in
respect of their need of a proper rationale for the common result
achieved by both.
Once the securities are found, however, on the basis of whatever factors are thought by the courts to be indicative of intent,
to have been specifically appropriated to the payment of the
principal obligation, their trust effect is held not to be vitiated
by the fact that they may also have been expressed to be for
indemnity purposes. 8 And once a trust for the creditor's benefit
is therefore held to have arisen, on the basis of the intent of the
parties to the security agreement, it ought logically to have the
following consequences, not all of which, however, are carried
out to their full extent by the courts in applying the trust principle.
It should follow, and is generally held to follow, that the
creditor need not have known beforehand of the existence of the
securities, nor relied upon them, his acceptance of the trust for
his benefit being presumed or at least sufficiently evidenced by
his mere filing of suit: "' that the prior exhaustion of his legal
. 7See the discussion below, beginning at p. 370 of the text.
9
3Brogan v. Ferguson, (1931) 101 Fla. 1311, 1317, 133 So. 317. 320
(on rehearing); Griffis v. First Nat'l Bank of Connersville, (1907) 168
Ind. 546. 552, 81 N. F. 490, 492; Loehr v. Colborn, (1883) 92 Ind. 24.
25-26; Union Nat'l Bank v. Rasch, (1895) 106 Mich. 319, 64 N. W. 339. 341.
But compare the facts and result in Burnett v. Gainesville Nat'l Bank.
(1922) 28 Ga. App. 255, 110 S. E. 753; and the statement in Pool v.
Doster, (1881) 59 Miss. 258. 263: "And even if the security is conditioned
for the payment of the debt, but stipulates for its enforcement in a
specified contingency, it will be held to Iea mere indemnity to the surety, and
only enforceable as such according to its terms."
-Forrest's Executors v. Luddington, (1880) 68 Ala. 1, 12; Plant v
Storey, (1891) 131 Ind. 46, 49, 30 N. H. 886, 887; Seibert v. True, (1871)
8 Kan. 52, 63; Demott v. Stockton Paper Ware Mfg. Co., (1880) 32
N. J. Eq. 124. 131; Curtis v. Tyler & Allen, (1842) 9 Paige Ch. (N.Y.)
432, 435-436; Moses v. Murgatroyd. (1814) 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 119, 129:
Rice's Appeal, (1875) 79 Pa. St. 168, 206; Kramer & Rahm's Appeal, (1860)
37 Pa. St. 71, 77; Johnson v. Martin, (1915) 83 Wash. 364, 145 Pac. 429.
432; Magill v. Brown. (1899) 20 Tex. Civ. App. 662, 676, 50 S. W. 143, 151.
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remedies upon the principal obligation is not an essential prerequisite to his remedy, in equity against the securities;100 and
that the securities follow the principal obligation without separate
assignment,101 and include all renewal notes evidencing the same.1*2
It should fellow that the interest of the surety in the securities
is subordinated to that of the creditor, 03 who is the "real party
in interest."'0 " It has therefore been held that a surety who has
partially paid the creditor. is not entitled to share in the proceeds
of the securities until the creditor has received payment in full. 103
But some courts, although purporting to apply the trust principle,
have nevertheless held that to whatever extent payment has
already been made by the surety, he is "entitled to occupy the
place and enjoy the right of the particular creditor, receiving his
pro rata share of the indemnity."' 00 In the absence of an expressed
intention otherwise, all creditors whose debts are secured in this
manner share ratably in the proceeds of the securities ;ot and the
LOODaniel v. Hunt, (1884) 77 Ala. 567, 570; Saffold v. Wade's Executors, (1874) 51 Ala. 214, 218-219; Demott v. Stockton Paper Ware Mfg.
32 N. J. Eq. 124, 131.
Co., (1880)
1'0 Arnett v. Salyersville Nat'l Bank, (1931) 242 Ky. 216, 219, 46 S. W.
(2d) 124, 126; Boyd v. Parker & Co., (1875) 43 Md. 182, 198; Haven v.
Foley & Papin, (1854) 19 Mo. 632, 636; Curtis v. Tyler & Allen, (1842) 9
Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 432, 435-436.
o2CuIilum v. Branch Bank at Mobile, (1853) 23 Ala. 797, 800.
203Ferrell-Michael Abstract & Title Co. v. McCormac, (Tex. Civ.
App., 1915) 184 S. W. 1081, 1084; Belcher v. The Hartford- Bank, (1843)
15 Conn. 381, 383; Seibert v. True, (1871) 8 Kan. 52, 64; Ten Eyck &
Brinckerhoff
v. Holmes, (1846) 3 Sandf. Ch. (N.Y.) 428, 430.
204Arnett v. Salyersville Nat'l Bank, (1931) 242 Ky. 216, 219, 46
S. W.05 (2d) 124, 126.
Kelly v. Herrick, (1881) 131 Mass. 373.
0OMoore v. Moberly, (1847) 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 299, 301-302. See also
Branch Bank at Mobile v. Robertson, (1851) 19 Ala. 798, 802; Roberts
v. Colvin, (1846) 3 Gratt. (Va.) 358, 364.
1olSaffold v. Wade's Executors, (1874) 51 Ala. 214, 218-219; Branch
Bank at Mobile v. Robertson, (1851) 19 Ala. 798, 802; Moore v. Moberly,
(1847) 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 299, 301-302; Kramer & Rahm's Appeal, (1860)
37 Pa. St. 71, 77; First Nat'l Bank of Bellville v. Wheeler, (Tex. Civ. App.,
1897) 41 S.W. 376, 377; Hauser v. King, (1882) 76 Va. 731, 735.
In Courier-Journal Job-Printing Co. v. Schaefer-Meyer Brewing Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1900) 101 Fed. 699, an agreement had been executed
whereby certain persons agreed to be sureties for the brewing company for
a four-year period upon any indebtedness that it might incur up to a total
amount of $25,000, the brewing company giving to them a mortgage, in the
amount of $25,000, conditioned upon its payment of the principal indebtedness. The sureties in fact signed notes for the brewing company in a total
amount of $35,000. The lower court held that the note-holders should share
in the proce.If the security in the order in which they acquired their
claims, whii left the petitioner out, since he fell within the final $10,000
of the indebtedness incurred. In reversing such ruling the circuit court of
appeals, composed of Taft, Lurton, and Day, JJ., stated through Lurton, J..
at 101 Fed. 705-706: "We have, however, concluded that every debt indorsed
by one or more of the mortgagees, within the time limit of the mortgage, is
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same principle of ratable equality ought to apply in behalf of the
surety himself wherever a separate claim.of his own against the
principal debtor is secured along with the one for which he is
08
surety.
It should follow that the surety cannot at any time, without
the concurrence of the creditor, release the securities to the principal debtor, or, with or without the concurrence of the principal
debtor, otherwise dispose of them to any other purpose than the
payment of the principal obligation, except to bona fide purchasers
for value of the legal title;1O9 that the acquisition by the surety of
entitled to share equally in the distribution of the indemnity provided by
the mortgage. The mortgagor did not intend to secure any particular indorsements. . . When the creditors holding such paper came to secure
the appropriation of the collateral deposited by the debtor with the surety,
justice is best obtained by equality of right. . . .Any creditor coming with
a debt made within four years after the date of the mortgage, and secured
mortby one or more of the mortgagees, is within the restrictions of tile
gage and within its equity." See also Albion State Bank v. Knickerbocker.
(1900) 125 Mich. 311, 315-316, 84 N. W. 311, 312-313, the facts of which
have been stated in note 87, above.
1O8Haggarty v. Pittman, (1828) 1 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 297, 299, 19 Am.
Dec. 434, 435: "But the defendant, Pittman (the surety], is not required to
pay over the money actually collected by him under the assignment, except so
far as it exceeds the amount of his own debt." See also Roberts v. Colvin,
(1846) 3 Gratt. (Va.) 358, 364.
But compare the opposing results reached in Ten Eyck & Brinckerhoff
v. Holmes, (1846) 3 Sandf. Ch. (N.Y.) 428, 430, and First Congregational
Society in Becket v. Snow, (1848) 1 Cush. (Mass.) 510, 518; for which
see note 94, above. Also compare the result reached in Eastman v.
Foster, (1844) 8 Mete. (Mass.) 19, 28-29, for which see note 95, above.
1O9Dyer v. Jacoway, (1905) 76 Ark. 171, 176, 88 S.W. 901, 902: "If
the conveyances are made to the surety for the purpose of securing the
payment of the debt, the creditor has an interest therein which the surety
cannot destroy" (dictum) ; Durham v. Craig, (1881) 79 Ind. 117. 121-122
("after acceptance by the creditor the surety cannot satisfy it, release it or
otherwise dispose of it, without the consent of the creditor") ; McCracken
v. German Fire Ins. Co., (1876) 43 Md. 471, 477: "The release of the
mortgage by the association, as his trustee, without the payment of the
debt, was a breach of trust, totally unauthorized, and did not destroy his
lien on the property;" Osborn v. Noble, (1872) 46 Miss. 449, 455: "The
fund or property at once takes on a trust character, and the surety can do no
act which will discharge the trust or release the property from the burden,
to the prejudice of the creditor" (dictum) ; Logan v. Mitchell, (1878) 67
Mo. 524, 528: ". . . if the securities are originally taken, not only to
indemnify the sureties but to secure the creditor, any action of theirs
would be powerless to affect him" (dictum) ; Magill v. Brown, (1899) 20
Tex. Civ. App. 662, 676, 50 S. W. 143. 151: ". .. whatever may have been
the rights of the Snyders and Magill to change the terms of the contract
prior to such acceptance by Brown Bros., they could not thereafter without
the latter's consent, so change it as to affect their rights."
Upon the hypothesis of a trust for the creditor's benefit having been
expressly intended, it is difficult to understand why the surety should have
any greater power to release the securities prior to the creditor's acceptance. as seems to be the inference of the language of the Indiana and Texas
cases quoted above, unless the creditor's non-acceptance with knowledge
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the principal debtor's equity of redemption in the securities does
not merge and thereby destroy the creditor's rights therein; 1
and that a recording of the security instrument, unless it be in
the form of a deed absolute, charges purchasers with notice of
the rights of the creditor thereunder."'
It should follow that it is not an essential prerequisite to the
enforcement of the creditor's rights in the securities that the surety
have been damnified,"' or even that he be liable upon the principal
obligation. Logically, if the question be entirely one of the intent
of the parties to the security agreement, the specific appropriation
of the securities to the payment of the principal obligation may
produce the trust result wherever the securities have been given
to the surety by a third person not a party to the principal
obligation, with as much reason as though they had been given to
him by the principal debtor."" But the courts have been less
should be held to constitute an implied disclaimer by him of the trust for

his benefit.
Supporting the statement in the text see also: Whitehead v. Henderson,
(1899) 67 Ark. 200, 56 S. W. 1065; Loehr v. Colborn, (1883) 92 Ind. 24,

30; Thornberry v. Thixton, (1883) 4 Ky. L. Rep. 825; In re Ellington
Planting Co., (1912) 131 La. 653, 60 So. 25, 27; Boyd v. Parker & Co.,
(1875)

43 Md. 182, 198-199; Owens v. Miller & Mayhew, (1868)

29

Md. 144, 161; Kunkel v. Fitzhugh, (1865) 22 Md. 567, 577-578; Eastman v.
Foster, (1844) 8 Metc. (Mass.) 19, 23-24; Union Nat'l Bank v. Rich, (1898)
116 Mich. 414, 74 N. W. 659; Union Nat'l Bank v. Rasch, (1895)
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Mich. 319, 64 N. W. 339; Carpenter v. Bowen, (1868) 42 Miss. 28; Haven

v. Foley & Papin, (1853) 18 Mo. 136; Ten Eyck & Brinckerhoff v. Holmes,
(1846) 3 Sandf. Ch. (N.Y.) 428; Clark v. Ely, (1844) 2 Sandf. Ch. (N.Y.)
166; Blanton v. Bostic, (1900) 126 N. C. 418, 35 S. F. 1035; Ijames v.
Gaither, (1885) 93 N. C. 358; Saylors v. Saylors, (1871) 3 Heisk. (Tenn.)

525, 531-532.
10 Durham v. Craig, (1881) 79 Ind. 117, 120-121; Oak Creek Valley

Bank v. Helmer, (1899) 59 Neb. 176, 187-188, 80 N. W. 891, 895.
"'Boyd v. Parker & Co., (1875) 43 Md. 182, 200; Eastman v. Foster,
(1844) 8 Mete. (Mass.) 19, 25; Oak Creek Valley Bank v. Helmer, (1899)
59 Neb. 176, 187-188, 80 N. W. 891, 895; Holt v. Penacook Savings Bank,
(1883) 62 N. H. 551, 554; Ijames v. Gaither, (1885) 93 N. C. 358, 362;
Ferrell-Michael Abstract & Title Co. v. McCormac, (Tex. Civ. App.,
1915) 184 S. W. 1081, 1083-1084.
"'2Forrest's Executors v. Luddington, (1880) 68 Ala. 1, 12: "Nor is
it important whether the surety has been damnified or not, nor whether his
liability continues, or is lost by the want of diligence on the part of the
creditor in taking the necessary steps to preserve it, or in consequence of a
discharge in bankruptcy. So long as the debt is unextinguished, the trust
remains and will be enforced;" Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ledyard,
(1846) 8 Ala. 866, 872: "The right of the holder to the benefit of this

security, does not depend upon the liability of the surety to be damnified;

it is because it is a trust created for the better security and protection of
the debt."

"83Magoffin v. Boyle Nat'l Bank of Danville, (1902) 24 Ky. L. Rep.
585, 586, 69 S. W. 702, 703, distinguishing Taylor v. Farmers' Bank of
Kentucky, (1888) 87 Ky. 398, 9 S. W. 240, on the ground that in the
earlier case the securities deposited by a stranger to the principal obli-
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prone in such cases to find, upon the basis of fictitious indicia
of intent, that the securities have been appropriated to the payment of the principal obligation, as distinguished from the purpose
of merely personal indemnity to the surety, so that a trust for the
creditor's benefit is less likely to be held to have arisen."' And in
several cases of securities furnished by the principal debtor, the
courts have emphasized, as the reason for their refusal to hold a
trust for the creditor's benefit to have arisen, that the surety himself
had never at any time been liable upon the principal obligation.""
But the creditor's rights in the securities are generally held to be
governed by the period of limitations applicable to security instruments, so that they may still be enforced although the period of
limitations applicable to the personal obligation has expired in
favor of both the principal debtor and the surety;'"6 and they
gation had been for the surety's indemnity only, whereas in the Magoffin

Case they were found to be "for the payment of the debt ;" Black v. Kaiser,
(1891) 91 Ky. 422, 427, 16 S. W. 89, 90-91 (dictum); King v. Harman's
Heirs, (1834) 6 La. 607, 26 Am. Dec. 485; Henderson-Achert Lithographic
Co. v. John Shillito Co., (1901) 64 Ohio St. 236, 251, 60 N. E. 295, 298
(dictum); Brown & Heywood Co. v. Ligon, (C.C. Mo. 1899), 92 Fed.
851, 855-856.
App. 315, 317 (personal indem"14Seefeldt v. Wilgen, (1915) 193 Ill.
nitor) : "To entitle appellant to recover, it must appear that the contract

was entered into directly and primarily for her benefit ;" Clay v. Freeman,
(1896) 74 Miss. 816, 20 So. 871; Hasbrouck v. Carr, (1914) 19 N. M.
586, 145 Pac. 133; Henderson-Achert Lithographic Co. v. John Shillito Co.,
(1901) 64 Ohio St. 236, 60 N. E. 295. See also note 96, above.
546; Bibb v. Martin, (1850)
1l15Constant v. Matteson, (1859) 22 Ill.
14 Smedes & Marshall (Miss.) 87; Hopewell v. Cumberland Bank, (1839)
10 Leigh (Va.) 206; Fagan v. Thompson, (C.C. Mo. 1889) 38 Fed. 467.
These can probably all be classified, however, as cases of merely indemnifying securities.
In Van Orden v. Durham, (1868) 35 Cal. 136, Hopkins had purchased
hotel furniture from Bird, giving his notes secured by a real estate mortgage
given by Durham, who was in turn secured by a chattel mortgage on the
hotel furniture, with power of sale. In holding that the note-holders were
entitled to foreclose upon one mortgage or the other, but not upon both, the
court relied largely upon the fact that Durham was never at any time personally liable upon the notes.
""Cullum v. Branch Bank at Mobile, (1853) 23 Ala. 797, 799-800 (the
period of limitations had run upon the personal liability both of the
surety, George Cullum, and the principal debtor, Charles Cullum): "Nor
does it make the slightest difference, that the note is barred by the statute
of limitations. So far as George Cullum is concerned, the creditor's
right to the security does not depend upon the liability of the surety to be
damnified, but upon the fact that the assignment was made to protect the debt.
...The security is not impaired as to Charles -Cullum, for the reason that the
statute of limitations, in cases of contract, affects the remedy only, without
discharging the debt;" Alexander v. West, (1931) 241 Ky. 541, 546, 44 S.W.

(2d) 518, 521 (the seven-year period of limitations applicable to the surety's

liability had expired, but the period applicable to the principal debtor's
liability was fifteen years, which had not yet expired; and the court applied
the rule that "unless a mortgage contains words of promise, it will be
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are also held not to be defeated by the existence of other defenses
personal to the surety,"' or of the principal debtor to the enforcement by the surety of his own rights in the securities. 1 8
barred by the same limitation as the debt it secures," which was therefore
fifteen years); People v. Metropolitan Surety Co., (1911) 148 App. Div. 503.
132 N. Y. S. 829, 830-831 (contractual time limitation applicable to surety's
liability had already expiied); Ijames v. Gaither, (1885) 93 N. C. 358
(surety's liability barred). Of course the fact that the surety's liability
alone is barred does not preclude him from voluntarily paying the principal obligation and thereafter realizing upon his own rights in the securities; but in Hooker v. Yellowley, (1901) 128 N. C. 297, 38 S. E. 889, 890.
the creditor was held to be entitled to the securities although the surety ld
already successfully pleaded the defense of the statute of limitations to
his personal liability.
-Compare -Eastman v. Foster, (1844) 8 Mete. (Mass.) 19, 28-29.
where, although the security had been given equally for the payment of
several notes, the surety was nevertheless held entitled to insist upon its
application towards the note upon which he was still liable, the period
of limitations having run upon his liability for the others: "Vc think it
quite clear, that so far as the creditors stand alike, in their legal and
equitable rights, it would not be competent for the mortgagee, by any
voluntary act of his own, to give a preference to one over another. We
think he could not, by voluntarily paying one in full, apply the proceeds
to indemnify himself, leaving the others unpaid. So if all were barred by
the statute of limitations, he could not create a pr~ference by waiving the
statute as to one, insisting on it as to the others. But the question is, whether
if he be discharged from one, and held liable on the others, by operation of
law, without any act or voluntary forbearance of his own, he is not entitled first to apply the fund so as to indemnify himself, and hold the
balance only for the other creditors. . . .I am inclined to think he would
have a right to be fully indemnified by paying in full the notes for which he
is thus liable. The original and primary object of taking the securities was
to indemnify the sureties [although the court had found a trust to have
arisen for the creditor's benefit, the securities being conditioned that the
mortgagors "shall pay said notes"]. For this purpose he had a legal
ight to the property, which might have been enforced at law by a foreclosure. An indemnity against the whole was an indemnity against each
part; so that when Henry's note was paid, the whole of the property was
applicable to the other four. Their claims, as amongst themselves, were
equal, and it is not on their account that Dickinson's note is entitled to
payment in full. But it is on account of the surety, who appears to me
not only to have a superior equity, but to stand upon the ground of another
rule of law, viz., that when two or more have equal claims in equity, and
one has a legal title, the legal title shall prevail."
In Smith v. Gillam, (1886) 80 Ala. 296, 302, it was properly held that
adverse possession operating to bar the surety would bar the creditor also:
"W'hen the title of the trustee is barred, so also is that of the cestui que
trust."
117
Plaut v. Storey, (1891) 131 Ind. 46, 52, 30 N. E. 886, 888 (here the
court held it to be entirely immaterial that the surety was the wife of the
principal debtor, so that her suretyship obligation was therefore voidable) ;
Lochr v. Colborn, (1883) 92 Ind. 24, 29-30 (here the sureties had assigned
the securities to the creditor in consideration of his releasing them from their
personal obligation; without determining the question whether the assignment of that to which the creditor was already entitled was adequate consideration for his release of the sureties, the court held the creditor to he
fully entitled to foreclose); Crosby v. Crafts, (1875) 5 Hun (N.Y.) 327,
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It should follow that the solvency or insolvency of neither
the principal debtor nor the surety is at all material to the existence
or enforcement of the creditor's rights in the securities."' In at
least two cases, however, the thought has been expressed that the
insolvency of the principal debtor and the surety causes the
transfer of the securities to the surety to partake of the nature
of a fraudulent conveyance. 120 But if this alone were the basis
330 (held to be immaterial that the surety's liability as joint debtor had
been discharged by death).
Compare the following Connecticut cases, in which, however, the
court had refused to find a trust for the creditor's benefit to have been the
intent of the security transaction: Jones v. Quinnipiack Bank, (1860) 29
Conn. 25, 46: "So, too, it is not easy to see how the County Bank can claim
any interest in the property through Barnum, given as it was to indem.
nify him against his indorsements, since the bank had released him from the
indorsements. . . As to him therefore, and all claiming under him, the
mortgage would seem to have become inoperative;" Thompson v. White,
(1881) 48 Conn. 509, 519: "If the indorsement had been discharged by tie
laches of the holder the security was gone, and no waiver by the indorser
could revive it."
"-Plaut v. Storey, (1891) 131 Ind. 46, 52, 30 N. E. 886, 888 (tie
court held it also to be immaterial that the mortgage from the husband
as principal debtor to the wife as surety may have been given with a
secret intent to defraud the husband's other creditors) : "It is not disputed
but that the indebtedness of James H. Arnold to the appellee [the principal
creditor] is bona fide, nor claimed that the appellee was a party to or
had any knowledge of the fraud. We are of the opinion that the appellee
does not claim through or under the mortgagee in any such sense as to be
affected by the frauds or secret equities between her and her husband;"
Rice's Appeal, (1875) 79 Pa. St. 168, 206 (the court here recognized that
the surety may not have been entitled to claim any benefit from the securities
because of his fiduciary relation as promoter of the corporate principal
debtor; the creditor was nevertheless held to be entitled).
Compare Lowry Banking Co. v. Empire Lumber Co., (1893) 91 Ga.
624, 17 S.E. 968, 970-971, a case of merely indemnifying securities, given
by an insolvent corporation to its directors to secure them against their prior
indorsements of its notes, in which the court held that the transaction was
"a plain, naked effort by an insolvent corporation to prefer and secure
members of its own body against impending loss about to be occasioned
by reason of their suretyship for the corporation," and that "inasmuch as
these sureties have no rights whatever, under these mortgages, the creditors
referred to can take nothing by subrogation."
In Alexander v. Ellison, (1880) 79 Ky. 148, 153, the principal debtor
was both a minor and under coverture, and it was held "not to be a material circumstance that the person furnishing the security is not himself
liable for the debt, nor is it material that the security is one which the
debtor9 has by operation of law rather than by contract."
11 Seibert v. True, (1871) 8 Kan. 52, 63-64 (surety's solvency or insolvency immaterial) ; Hauser v. King, (1882) 76 Va. 731, 734 (same);
Magill v. Brown, (1899) 20 Tex. Civ. App. 662, 676, 50 S. W. 143, 150
(principal debtor's solvency or insolvency immaterial). The Alabama court
apparently attached no significance to the fact that both the principal debtor
and the surety were insolvent in Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ledyard,
(1846) 8 Ala. 866, or to the fact that the principal debtor was insolvent
in Branch
Bank at Mobile v. Robertson, (1851) 19 Ala. 798.
20
1Haggarty v. Pittman, (1828) 1 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 297, 298, 19 Am.
Dec. 434, 435: "This court will never for a moment sanction the idea
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for the creation of a trust, it should redound equally to the
benefit of all the 'creditors of the principal debtor, rather than
create a preference in favor of the particular creditors to whom
the insolvent surety is also liable. In a few other cases, although
the securities were found to have been given for the payment of
the principal obligation, the courts nevertheless appeared to attach
some significance to the fact that either the principal debtor or
the surety, or both, were insolvent.12 But it may safely be surmised that in most of the cases in which the creditor is proceeding
against the securities, rather than against the principal debtor or
the surety personally, it is because either one or the other or both
are in fact insolvent; and the general lack of emphasis upon this
factor, in cases where the securities are construed to have been
given for the payment of the principal obligation, indicates its
immateriality.
There have also been held to follow such incidental consequences as that the creditor loses his right to levy execution, under
a judgment against the principal debtor for the principal obligation,
upon the latter's equity of redemption in the mortgage security ;1that the creditor may lose his right to prove in bankruptcy or
insolvency proceedings for the full amount of the principal obligation ;123 that a national bank may validly acquire in this way a
mortgage upon real estate ;124 that the principal debtor may
become entitled to deduct the amount of the principal obligation
from the assessed valuation of the mortgage security ;15 and that a
trust for the benefit of the particular creditor may be enlarged
into a general assignment for the benefit of all the principal
that debtors in failing circumstances shall be permitted to put their creditors
in the power of an insolvent assignee, by a voluntary assignment of their
property, to him, although it is expressed to be for the payment of their
debts, or for his indemnity against prior responsibilities ;" In re Ellington
Planting Co., (1912) 131 La. 654, 659, 60 So. 25, 27: "It would be inequitable to permit a joint debtor, who is insolvent, to divert a fund from
a creditor, to whom he owes it, into his own irresponsible pocket."
121See McCracken v. German Fire Ins. Co., (1876) 43 Md. 471, 477;
Oak Creek Valley Bank v. Helmer, (1899) 59 Neb. 176, 189-190, 80 N. W.
891, 895; First Nat'l Bank of Bellville v. Wheeler, (Tex. Civ. App., 1896)
33 S. W. 1093, 1095, aff'd, Wheeler v. First Nat'l Bank of Bellville, (Tex.
Civ. App., 1897) 41 S. W. 376; Johnson v. Martin, (1915) 83 Wash. 364,
145 Pac.
429, 432.
122 Carpenter v. Bowen, (1868) 42 Miss. 28, 53-54; see note 79, above.
12341n re Jerome B. Fickett, (1881) 72 Me. 266; see note 28, above.
12Magoffin v. Boyle Nat'l Bank of Danville, (1902) 24 Ky. L. Rep.
585, 587, 69 S. W. 702, 703; Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Combs, (1933)
251 Ky. 540, 65 S. W. (2d) 696; Mathews v. Abbott, (D.C. Me-, 1878)
2 Hask 289, Fed. Cas. No. 9,275.
' 25 State v. Campbell, (1896) 59 N. J. L. 378, 35 Ati. 788.
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debtor's creditors ratably, by virtue of a statute providing that
the conveyance of property by an insolvent debtor to a particular
creditor, for the purpose of securing any demand other than his
own antecedent debt, shall automatically be so enlarged. 12
Finally, to-the extent that the holding of a trust for tile
creditor's benefit to have been the intent of the security instrument results in the subordination of the interest of the surety in
the securities to that of the creditor, 127 it ought logically to follow
that the surety is released from his personal liability to the
creditor by any change in the contract between the latter and tile
principal debtor, unconsented to by the surety, or by any release
by the creditor of his rights in any other securities given by the
principal debtor for the payment of the principal obligation, if
that would be the effect of such action apart from the holding of
the securities by the surety as trustee.' 28 For on the hypothesis
that he holds them only as trustee, his own interest being subordinated to that of the creditor, the reason for the rule that a
fully indemnified surety is not released from his personal liability
by such action on the part of the creditor' 29 falls to the ground.
126Pendery v. Allen, (1893) 50 Ohio St. 121, 132, 33 N. E. 716, 719:
... Emerson, in accepting the mortgage as indemnity against loss in
the performance of his promise to pay the bank, became, within the meaning of section 6343, Rev. St., an assignee of the property covered by the
mortgage in trust for the benefit of the bank, and, as a consequence of the
provisions of that section, held it in trust for all the creditors of Allen.
according to the amount of their respective demands.
. . . For this
indebtedness he was not previously liable as surety; and . . . the statute
cannot be evaded by assuming a liability as surety for the insolvent debtor.
as part
of the transaction by which the mortgage is given."
127 See above, p. 349 of the text, note 103.
28
1 Apparently no case enunciating the theory of a trust for the creditor's
benefit has at the same time had occasion to hold that the surety is not
released from his personal liability by the creditor's release of the principal
debtor or of other securities held directly by him for the payment of the
principal obligation. With respect to indemnifying securities generally,
according to Dean Arant, "No case has been noted where an indemnified
surety urged the release of security as a defense. [See, however, Crim v.
Fleming, (1884) 101 Ind. 154, 156-159, apparently holding that such a
surety is not released by the creditor's release of other security.] But such
a surety is not discharged by a release of the principal debtor. Jones v.
Ward, 71 Wis. 152, 36 N. W. 711 (1888). Nor by an extension of time.
Home Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Waterman's Estate, 134 Ill.
461, 29 N. E.

503 (1890) ; Smith v. Steele's Estate, 25 Vt. 427, 60 Am. Dec. 376 (1853) ;
Fay v. Tower, 58 Wis. 286, 16 N. W. 558 (1883). It is generally assumed
that such a surety would not be discharged by a release of security. 21
R. C. L. 1054." Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty
221, note 13; Arant, Why Release of Security Discharges a Surety, (1930)
14 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 725, 727, note 13.
29
1
It is difficult to accept Dean Arant's statement that "The basis of this

view is the generally conceded right of the creditor to utilize for the payment of his debt any security given to the surety by the principal."

Arant,
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The surety who is held to hold the securities merely as trustee
130
for the creditor is not in fact fully indemnified.
B. Where the Securities Are Merely for t1w Personal Indemnity of thw Surety -It has already been seen that in the case
first enunciating the theory of a trust arising for the creditor's
benefit in securities given by the principal debtor to the surety,"'
Chancellor Kent drew no distinction between securities appropriated to the payment of the principal obligation and securities
restricted in their purpose solely to the surety's indemnification;
nor were the securities involved in the case itself specifically
Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 237; Arant, Why Release of Security Discharges a Surety, (1930) 14 M6INNESOTA LAW RI'viEw
725, 743. If such be the proper basis the same result would follow a
fortiori in all cases holding a trust for the creditor's benefit to have been
the specific intent of the security transaction. But obviously, under no
circumstances does the creditor have any greater rights in securities held
by the surety than in securities received and held by himself, without the
surety's interposition. Yet the release by the creditor of his securities of the
latter type is held to discharge an unindemnified surety. The only basis for
holding that it does not so discharge an indemnified surety is the assumption
that "no matter what the creditor did with the collateral securities, he
[the surety] could lose nothing." See Crim v. Fleming, (1884) 101 Ind.
154, 158-159. Yet in the type of cases now under consideration, finding a
trust for the creditor's benefit to which the interest of the surety may be
such an assumption may frequently prove unfounded.
subordinated,
3

1 OExcept wherever the securities are so ample "that there is no chance
that what the principal gave him may not produce as much money as he is
required to pay the creditor." Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship
and Guaranty 237; Arant, Why Release of Security Discharges a Surety,
(1930) 14 MnINESOTA LAw REIEW 725, 744. But even in such a case,
except for the burden of suit, the surety is certainly no more fully indemnified than he is by virtue of his right of subrogation to the securities held
by the creditor, if they are equally ample. Dean Arant contends that the
release by the creditor of the principal debtor or of other securities should
operate -to discharge even an indemnified surety, because of "the burden of
paying the creditor and later realizing upon whatever he had that caused
the court to say that he was 'indemnified.' . . . since the indemnity is usually
in the form of a bond, pledge or mortgage, involving the probable inconvenience of a suit, sale or foreclosure, it is obvious that the burden is not

negligible." In this instance Dean Arant's conclusions sustain the

writer's,

although upon somewhat different reasoning.
In Blackstone Bank v. Hill, (1830) 10 Pick. (Mass.) 128, 132, the
court assumed "that an extension of credit ... given to the principal without
the consent of the surety, if made out, would be a good defence" to the
personal liability of an indemnified surety, but held that the defense was
not made out. -In Livingston v. Moore, (1897) 15 App. Div. 15, 44 N. Y. S.
125, appeal dismissed, Livingston v. City of Albany, (1900) 161 N. Y. 602,
56 N. E. 148, the same sureties whose indemnifying securities were unsuccessfully sought to be appropriated to the payment of the principal
obligation in City of Albany v. Andrews, (1898) 29 App. Div. 20, 52
N. Y. S. 1129, were held to have been discharged from their personal
obligation by virtue of a change in the contract between the creditor and
the principal debtor, the court in no way alluding to the fact that the
were indemnified.
sureties
5
3' Moses v. Murgatroyd. (1814) 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 119, 129.
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found to have been given for the broader purpose. Many courts.
however, have emphasized such a distinction, in respect both to
the existence of rights in the creditor and to the conditioning
circumstances, extent, and consequences thereof. 182 The chief
factors that have been emphasized by the courts in finding the
particular securities to have been given for the broader purpose
of payment of the principal obligation, even though in terms
8
given for the surety's indemnity, have already been noted.' '
Assuming, however, that the particular securities are found to
have been given solely for the more restricted purpose of the
surety's indemnity, the American cases fall generally into the
following three categories: (1) those that work out the creditor's
rights through so-called subrogation to the exact position of the
surety; (2) those that make the existence of rights in the
creditor depend upon the insolvency of the principal debtor or the
surety or of both; and (3) those that reach the trust result the
same as though the securities were found to have been specifically
appropriated to the payment of the principal obligation."'
There are numerous statements in the American cases reminiscent of the excerpt already quoted from the opinion of Sir
3
William Grant, M. R., in Wright v. Morley' -to the effect
that subrogation of the surety and subrogation of the creditor are
but the converse sides of the same shield for the protection of the
party thought by the court to be the one equitably entitled to
' 32 See Forrest's Executors v. Luddington, (1880) 68 Ala. 1, 7-8:
Daniel v. Hunt, (1884) 77 Ala. 567, 569-570; Dyer v. Jacoway, (1905)
76 Ark. 171, 176, 88 S. W. 901, 903; Constant v. Matteson, (1859) 22 I1.
546, 556; Chambers v. Prewitt, (1898) 172 Ill. 615, 623, 50 N. E. 145, 147:
Durham v. Craig, (1881) 79 Ind. 117, 120-121; Tilford v. James, (1847)
7 B. Mon. (Ky) 336; Macklin v. Northern Bank of Kentucky, (1885) 83
Ky. 314, 318; Black v. Kaiser, (1891) 91 Ky. 422, 427, 16 S. W. 89, 90-91 :
Magoffin v. Boyle Nat'l Bank of Danville, (1902) 24 Ky. L. Rep. 585.
586, 69 S. W. 702, 703; King v. Harman's Heirs, (1834) 6 La. 607, 26 Am.
Dec. 485; Blackstone Bank v. Hill, (1830) 10 Pick. (Mass.) 128, 133:
Albion State Bank v. Knickerbocker, (1900) 125 Mich. 311, 317, 84 N. W.
311, 314; Osborn v. Noble, (1872) 46 Miss. 449, 454-455; Logan v. Mitchell.
(1878) 67 Mo. 524, 528; Nilkin v. Silverman, (1924) 95 N. J. Eq. 396,
397, 123 Atl. 531, 532; Keene Five Cents Savings Bank v. Herrick, (1882)
62 N. H. 174, 175; Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Reeder, (1849) 18 Ohio
35, 46; Henderson-Achert Lithographic Co. v. John Shillito Co., (1901) 64
Ohio St. 236, 252, 60 N. E. 295, 298; rertig v. Henne, (1901) 197 Pa. St.
560, 567-568, 47 Atl. 840.
183See above, text at notes 89-94 inclusive.
13
4See Note, (1896) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 64-65: "The cases are in a
hopeless state of confusion as to what circumstances, if any, give a creditor
the right to have securities deposited under a contract of naked indemnity
applied in payment of the debt to him."
235(1805) 11 Vesey Jun. 12, 22; see above, at p. 318 of the text.
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the benefit of -the securities. Thus the supreme court of Nebraska
stated as the basis of its decision in Meeker v. Waldron :,38
"Had the principal creditors possessed collateral security and
the personal surety had paid the indebtedness it would hardly be
doubted that he would be entitled to be subrogated to the rights
of the creditors to such collateral security; and on a parity of
reasoning, we can see no difference in principle as to the right
of the principal creditors to be subrogated to the rights of the
13 T

surety upon his inability or failure to respond to his obligation.

1

In reply to such reasoning Dean Arant has pointed out that
the surety's right of subrogation requires the burdensome act on
his part of payment of the principal obligation or of a part
thereof, and does not occur until the creditor holding the securities has been paid in full, and therefore cannot possibly be
prejudiced. 3 8
"Nor can the other creditors of the principal object, since
they are no worse off when the creditor is forced to assign his
security to the surety than they would have been if he had utilized
all of his priorities and securities,
39 and resorted to the principal for
payment instead of the surety."'
This does not entirely explain, however, why the paying surety,
who without the aid of the doctrine of subrogation is by hypothesis
an unsecured creditor in respect of his rights of exoneration and
reimbursement from the principal debtor, should be converted into
a secured one by the aid of that doctrine. As an original propositiofi, if not foreclosed by authority, it would seem at least plausibly
arguable that the doctrine of marshalling ought to require a
creditor with personal security as well as a mortgage lien from
the principal debtor, to exhaust the first before striking the
second,for the benefit of junior encumbrancers whose only security
is in the mortgaged property."'0 The doctrine of the surety's
136(1901) 62 Neb. 689, 695, 87 N. W. 539, 541.
37
For other similar statements see also Saffold v. Wade's Executor,
(1874) 51 Ala. 214, 218-219; Union Nat'l Bank v. Rasch, (1895) 106
Mich. 319,-328, 64 N. W. 339, 342; Bibb v. Martin, (1850) 14 Smedes &
Marshall (Miss.) 87, 92-93; Osborn v. Noble, (1872) 46 Miss. 449, 453-454;
Kinsey v. McDearmon, (1868) 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 392, 396; Hauser v. King,
(1882)5 8 76 Va. 731, 733-734.
' 3 Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 370.
'39 Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 359.
40
0f course the answer to the suggestion in the text is that the
obligation of the surety, although security for the debtor, is not the property
of the debtor, and the subrogation of the surety to the creditor's preferences
over junior encumbrancers is justified by the fact that "in this way the
creditor is denied the power of throwing the ultimate payment of the debt
in one way or another as suits his caprice." 4 Williston, Treatise on the
Law of Contracts, rev. ed.. 3620.
2
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subrogation is after all a creature of "natural equity." '' judicially
conceived, whereby the courts keep alive the creditor's securities,
even after technical extinguishment of the creditor's own rights
in them, for the benefit of the party thought to be most equitably
entitled to them.
Nor is it entirely accurate to say that the surety's burdensome
act of payment of the principal obligation is in all cases absolutely
essential to the enforcement of what the courts at least have
called his right of subrogation. In Harmon v. Weston" 2 the
principal debtor was himself one of the creditors, in that he was
one of the beneficiaries of the trust estate which as trustee he
had largely dissipated. In a suit for the benefit of the trust
estate against Weston as principal and the American Surety
Company as surety, upon Weston's trustee's bond, it was held that
the judgment against the surety company should be diminished in
the proportion of Weston's interest in the trust estate, the court
saying:
"It is of course true that the right to subrogation strictly
so called does not arise in favor of a surety until he has paid the
debt for which he is bound, and there is no occasion to cite
authority for the rule; but it is also true that to avoid circuity of
action equity will protect those who by an enforced payment will
become at once entitled by subrogation to indemnity from the one
who is to receive that payment.""' 3
Of course it may be said that the court in the above case
was confusing the surety's right of subrogation with its right of
exoneration, and that all it did was to enforce by way of set-off
the right of exoneration. But if the basis and content of a
principle and the results achieved by it are more important than
the name by which it is called, it is believed that the court was
applying in behalf of the surety much the same principle upon
which the creditor's so-called right of subrogation is basednamely, that in order to avoid circuity of action equity will give
aid to those who upon an enforced realization of the indemnifying
securities will become immediately entitled to the proceeds thereof.
141See Taylor v. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky, (1888) 87 Ky. 398.
401-402, 9 S. W. 240, 241; Dowell v. Woodsides, (1894) 16 Ky. L. Rep.
325, 327, 27 S. W. 853, 854; Osborn v. Noble, (1872) 46 Miss. 449, 453-454;
South Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Wright & Baldwin, (1895) 45 Neb. 23, 27-28.
63 N. W. 126, 127-128; Henderson-Achert Lithographic Co. v. John Shillito
Co., (1901) 64 Ohio St. 236, 251, 60 N. E. 295, 298. "Subrogation does not
depend upon contract, but on the equities of the situation." 4 Williston.
Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed., 3620.
142(1913) 215 Mass. 242, 102 N. E. 470.
143(1913) 215 Mass. 242, 247-248, 102 N. E.470, 473.
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The majority of cases basing the creditor's rights in the surety's
indemnifying securities upon the subrogation theory restrict the
creditor to the surety's own rights therein, and therefore require,
as an essential prerequisite to their enforcement, that the surety
already have been damnified through his liability having become
absolute.144 This is normally the event that first enables the
surety himself to realize upon the securities. Even although
the indemnity is against "loss" rather than against "liability,"
"loss" may be held to occur when the principal debtor defaults,
the surety remaining liable, 4 5 or at least when judgment is
entered against the surety.146 Up to the moment of the surety's
damnification he may release the securities to the principal
debtor, or may effect a novation in their purpose by a new agreement with the principal debtor, in neither event requiring the concurrence of the creditor. 147 Until then the interest of the surety
144Morris v. Bowman & Brown, (1928) 175 Ark. 1073, 1076-1077; Van

Orden v. Durham, (1868) 35 Cal. 136, 145-146; Henry Clews & Co. v.
First Mortgage Bondholders of the Brunswick & A. R. Co., (1875) 54 Ga.
316; Lowry Banking Co. v. Empire Lumber Co., (1893) 91 Ga. 624, 633,
17 S. E. 968, 971; Constant v. Matteson, (1859) 22 Ill.
546, 556; Nourse
v. Weitz, (1903) 120 Iowa 708, 714, 95 N. W. 251, 253; Tilford v. James,
(1847) 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 336; Bibb v. Martin, (1850) 14 Smedes & Marshall
(Miss.) 87, 93; Osborn v. Noble, (1872) 46 Miss. 449, 454; Logan v.
Mitchell, (1878) 67 Mo. 524, 528; City of Albany v. Andrews, (1898) 29
App. Div. 20, 24, 52 N. Y. S. 1129, 1131; Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v.
Reeder, (1849) 18 Ohio 35, 46; Henderson-Achert Lithographic Co. v.
John Shillito Co., (1901) 64 Ohio St. 236, 251, 60 N. E. 295, 297; Waller
v. Oglesby, (1887) 85 Tenn. 321, 322-324, 3 S. W. 504; Willard v. Worsham,
(1882) 76 Va. 392, 402; Courier-Journal Job-Printing Co. v. SchaeferMeyer
Brewing Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1900) 101 Fed. 699, 705.
' 45 Daniel v. Hunt, (1884) 77 Ala. 567, 571: "When this happened, there
was, in legal contemplation, a loss to the surety, who was personally bound
for the payment of the debt It is plain that the word 'loss,' here, means
nothing more than legal damage, detriment, or forfeiture;" Loehr v. Colborn, (1883) 92 Ind. 24, 29-30: "There are many cases, however, in which
the mortgagee, in an indemnifying mortgage, may foreclose before he sustains actual loss or damage." See also note 96, above, and the cases there
cited.
But compare Taylor v. De Camp, (1933) 132 Cal. App. 640, 644, 23
Pac. (2d) 61, 62; and City of Albany v. Andrews, (1898) 29 App. Div.
20, 24,
52 N. Y. S. 1129, 1131.
146See Burnett v. Gainesville Nat'l Bank, (1922) 28 Ga. App. 255, 110
S. E. 753; and Bibb v. Martin, (1850) 14 Smedes & Marshall (Miss.) 87,
93-94.47
' Dyer v. Jacoway, (1905) 76 Ark. 171, 88 S.W. 901; Jones v. Quinnipiack Bank, (1860) 29 Conn. 25; Thompson v. White, (1881) 48 Conn.
509; Horsey v. Stockley, (1861) 2 Del. Ch. 290; McIntyre v. Tenny, (1882)
4 Ky. L. Rep. 259; Taylor v. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky, (1888) 87 Ky.
398, 9 S.W. 240; Woodville v. Reed, (1866) 26 'Ad. 179, 191; Chanter v.
Reardon, (1875) 32 Mich. 162; Osborn v. Noble, (1872) 46 Miss. 449;
Logan v. Mitchell, (1878) 67 Mo. 524; Stone v. Furber, (1886) 22 Mo.
App. 498; Miller v. Stiger & Wack, (1831) 1 N. J. Eq. 204; Fertig v.
Henne, (1901) 198 Pa. St. 560, 47 AtI. 840; Henderson-Achert Litho-
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in the securities, and consequently that of the creditor, is contingent rather than absolute.
At the moment of damnification within the terms of the
indemnity agreement, however, the surety's interest in the securities becomes absolute and presently realizable by him. Such interest is a genuine, presently-available asset of his estate, in exactly
the same sense that the promise to pay the debt of another in the
ordinary third-party creditor-beneficiary situation is upon maturity
a genuine, presently-available asset of the promisee's estate. 14
And, likewise in the same sense as the promise to pay the debt
of another, it is an asset of the surety's estate of a peculiar and
unique character-peculiar and unique in that, unless the surety
has already paid the creditor and in the absence of complications
of insolvency, realization will necessarily redound to the benefit
of the particular creditor to the exclusion of the surety's other
creditors, whose only interest is that to the extent of the indemnifying securities the surety's other assets not be depleted by the
payment of the particular obligation against which he is itldemnified.' 49
As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in King
v. Harman'sHeirs,150 it would be unthinkable for a court of equity
to permit the surety, after damnification but before actual payment
by him of the principal obligation, to realize upon the securities
"without requiring security that it should be paid over to the
original creditors."''
Such a requirement is necessary for the
graphic Co. v. John Shillito Co.. (1901) 64 Ohio St. 236, 60 N. E. 295;
Waller v. Oglesby, (1887) 85 Tenn. 321, 3 S. W. 504.
But compare Boyd v. Parker & Co., (1875) 43 Md. 182, 199-200, in
which the court in a dictum discounted the previous dictum by the same
court in Woodville v. Reed, cited above in this note, and expressed the
opinion that the surety may not so release securities given for his indemnity only; Union Nat'l Bank v. Rich, (1898) 116 Mich. 414, 74 N. W. 659,
in which the court held it to have become res adjudicata as the result
of the former case involving the same parties, Union Nat'l Bank v. Rasch,
(1895) 106 Mich. 319, 64 N. W. 339, that the surety could not so release
the securities, although in the former case the court had purported to
accept the contention of counsel that the securities were a mere personal
indemnity only, "as it clearly appears that it was not the intent of the mortgagors to create by this security a fund out of which to pay the note:"
Magill v. Brown, (1899) 20 Tex. Civ. App. 662, 676, 50 S.W. 143, 150151, in which the court expressed the opinion that the trust result would
have followed, precluding the surety from releasing the securities, even
though they had been construed to have been given for the surety's indemnity
only.
1482 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed.. 1058.
1492 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed.. 1059-1060.
150(1834) 6 La. 607, 622, 26 Am. Dec. 485, 490.
51

' See also McConnell v. Scott, (1846)

15 Ohio 401, 403: Kramer &
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protection of the principal debtor, who might otherwise be left to
pay the creditor without effective recourse against the surety for
the return of the securities.
As a presently-available asset of the already damnified surety,
the realization of which will necessarily redound to the benefit
of the particular creditor exclusively, the surety's interest in the
securities may be reached by the particular creditor at least to the
same extent that he may reach any other asset of the surety not
so restricted in its purpose. In cases in which judgment already
has been rendered against the indemnified surety and execution
thereon has been returned unsatisfied, the courts in according
direct rights to the particular creditor in the indemnifying
securities are merely enforcing the typical process of equitable
execution. 52 The courts that do not require that a judgment
already have been rendered against the surety, and that execution
thereon have been returned unsatisfied, merely are taking a shortcut to the same result for the purpose of avoiding circuity and
multiplicity of actions.' 5'
If it be objected that the surety should control the time of
realization upon his own indemnifying securities, in order that
they may not be sold at a sacrifice and the surety left liable for a
deficiency without further indemnity,"5 4 it may be replied that
we are dealing by hypothesis with a surety who is already in
default upon the principal obligation; so that by not paying the
creditor the surety has lost his exclusive control over the realization of. this particular asset at least to the same extent that he
has lost his exclusive control over the realization of any other
asset that is subject to execution for the principal indebtedness.
Dean Arant's answer that the creditor should not have an enforceable interest in the pecurities without the surety's consent "unless
Rahm's Appeal, (1860) 37 Pa. St. 71, 77; Breedlove v. Stump, (1830)
3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 257, 263; Kirkman & Luke v. Bank of America, (1865) 2
Coldw. (Tenn.) 397, 407.
"52McConnell v. Scott, (1846) 15 Ohio 401, 403: "He has his judgment,
and may take out his execution at pleasure; but if he has not collected his
money of the surety, and the sprety has made it out of the property or
credits of the principal, equity will decree its application in discharge of the
creditor's judgment against the surety."
15Nourse v. Weitz, (1903) 120 Iowa 708, 714, 95 N. W. 251, 253;
South Omaha Natl Bank v. Wright & Baldwin, (1895) 45 Neb. 23, 27,
63 N. W. 126, 127; Keene Five Cents Savings Bank v. Herrick, (1882) 62
N. H. 174, 178; Union Nat'! Bank v. Rasch, (1895) 106 Mich. 319, 64 N. W.
339, 342; and see Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Reeder, (1849) 18 Ohio 35,
46-47.
"54 See Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 372.
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he acquires it by recourse to ordinary legal proceedings" 1' is an
argument merely against the equitable short-cut rather than
against the result ultimately accomplished. And it should also
follow that the surety's other unsecured creditors are hardly in
any better position to object than is the surety himself, since the
particular creditor might equally have brought about a forced'
realization of the surety's other available assets-although by a
less direct procedure-for which the indemnifying securities
would be equally insufficient to compensate.
It should be remembered in this connection that in the state
of New York the decision in Lawurence v. Fox 5" was preceded
by decisions holding that the assuming grantee of a mortgagor's
equity of redemption becomes directly liable to the mortgagee,
upon the theory of his promise to pay the mortgage debt having
constituted an indemnifying agreement with the original mortgagor, who now stood in the position of a surety for the principal
indebtedness. 117 Professor Corbin has recognized that the doctrine of subrogation "has no doubt been very beneficial in spite
of fiction and artificiality," and appears to approve the result
reached wherever "it is used only as against one who is already
legally indebted in order to secure the fulfillment of that legal
duty;" but he also has pointed out that in cases of an assuming
grantee from a mortgagor who is not himself personally liable upon
the principal indebtedness "it has been used to confer new security
'
and new rights upon a creditor, as a gift out of a clear sky."
To this day a number of the courts applying the suretyship analogy
to the case of an assuming grantee of mortgaged property base
a distinction in result upon whether or not the immediate grantor
was himself personally liable for the principal indebtednessholding that in the former case the grantee becomes directly
liable to the mortgagee, whereas in the latter he does not.159 For
' 5 5 Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 372.
156(1859) 20 N. Y. 268.
157Curtis v. Tyler & Allen, (1842) 9 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 432, 435-436;
Vail and
Vail v. Foster, (1850) 4 N. Y. 312. 313-314.
155 Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, (1918) 27 Yale

L. J. 51008, 1016.

'1 Dussault v. Wellman, (1927) 130 Misc. Rep. 614, 224 N. Y. S. 321,
324: "The test is whether the defendants were personally responsible for
the payment of the indebtedness. If they are not liable, the covenant of their
grantee did not place the latter in the position of a surety for the grantors,
and, the grantors being under no liability to the creditor, the covenant

could not inure to his benefit. When the grantor, however, in such a con-

veyance is personally liable for the payment of the incumbrance, the
grantee becomes the principal debtor by such an agreement, and the

grantor stands in the situation of a mere surety for him as to the payment
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him to become directly liable to the mortgagee in the latter case,
the result must be based upon third-party-beneficiary contractual
principles rather than upon the suretyship analogy. 1 0
The immediately preceding discussion has assumed the absence
of complications of insolvency. The ordinary La-wrencc v. Fox
third-party creditor-beneficiary -situation is in no way affected by
the insolvency of either the promisee or the promisor, other than
by the reduction of the beneficiary's recovery proportionately, since
his right against both is presumably in personam only, and in no
way preferred over either's other general creditors. Nor do the
courts following Lawrence v. Fox purport to make the beneficiary's
rights depend in any way upon the insolvency of either the promisee
or the promisor. As already intimated, however, several American
courts have purported to base the creditor's rights in indemnifying
securities held by his surety upon the insolvency of the principal
of such incumbrance, so as to give the holder of the incumbrance a right
in equity to resort to the grantee for payment if the premises upon which
it is a lien should prove insufficient for that purpose." See also Minnesota
Annotations to the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, sec. 136: "Where
a mortgagor who is personally indebted sells his interest in the property
to a transferee who assumes the payment of the debt the mortgagee clearly
is a creditor beneficiary, and the finnesota decisions uniformly permit him
to sue the transferee-promisor. Follansbee v. Johnson, (1881) 28 Minn.
311, 9 N. NV. 882; Wood v. Johnson, (1912) 117 Minn. 267, 135 N. W. 746;
Marshall State Bank v. Buesing, (1929) 179 Minn. 77, 228 N. W. 348; see
Scanlan v. Grimmer, (1898) 71 Minn. 351, 74 N. W. 146, 70 Am. St. Rep.
326. Where the transferor is not personally indebted, but nevertheless an
assumption clause is included in the deed, the Minnesota cases deny recovery.
Brown v. Stillman, (1890) 43 Minn. 126, 45 N. V. 2; Nelson v. Rogers,
(1891) 47 Minn. 103, 49 N. W. 526; Kramer v. Gardner, (1908) 104 Minn.
370, 116 N. W. 925, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 492; Clement v. Willett, (1908)
105 Minn. 267, 117 N. W. 491, 17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1094, 127 Am. St. Rep.
562, 15 Ann. -Cas. 1053." The Minnesota cases, however, have not based
the distinction expressly upon the suretyship analogy, but rather upon
the fact that the mortgagee, in the case of an assuming grantee from
a grantor who is not himself personally liable upon the mortgage indebtedness, is a mere donee- rather than a creditor-beneficiary; Minnesota having
accorded somewhat greater rights to creditor- than to donee-beneficiaries.
See Minnesota Annotations to the Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
secs. 135 and 136.
1'OSee 2 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed., 11231124: "Where, however, the grantor exacts or the grantee undertakes an
assumption of the mortgage debt in the belief, which later proves to be
erroneous, that the grantor is liable therefor, the mortgagee is a creditor
beneficiary and may recover from the grantee unless there was such a
mutual mistake on the part of the grantor and the grantee as to render the
contract of assumption voidable. .

.

. It follows that the creditor bene-

ficiary's right of action is not dependent upon an actual obligation owing to
him by the promisee, but it is sufficient if there is a bona fide supposed or
asserted obligation -which the promisor has undertaken to perform." See
also Restatement, Contracts, sec. 144.
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debtor or the surety, or of both.

Thus the supreme court of

West Virginia stated in New Martinsville Bank v. Hart : 13

"The decisions in some of the states, notably those of Mississippi, hold that the creditor will not ordinarily be entitled to the
benefit of securities given by the principal debtor to indemnify the
surety, unless they are also made subject to the payment of the
debt ....

Most, if not all, of the courts adhering to the Mississippi

doctrine, recognize an exception in cases where the debtor is insolvent." 62
But the above most certainly is not an accurate statement of
the conclusion to be drawn from the Mississippi cases, which distinguish securities appropriated to the payment of the principal
obligation from securities restricted to the personal indemnification of the surety, only for the purpose of confining the rights of
the creditor in the latter situation to those of the surety, upon the
theory of subrogation, rather than according to him paramount
rights in the securities upon the theory of a trust having been intended for his benefit.163 Where the surety himself has no pres161(1927) 103 W. Va. 290, 293-294, 137 S. E. 222-223.
'6 2 See also Dyer v. Jacoway, (1905) 76 Ark. 171, 176, 88 S. W. 901,
903: "But if the conveyance to the surety is only to indemnify him, then such
security does not, in the first instance, attach to the debt, and whatever
equity may arise in favor of the creditor with regard to the security
arises afterwards, and in consequence of the insolvency of the parties
principally liable for the debt;" McIntyre v. fenny. (1882) 4 Ky. L. Rep.
259 (insolvency of both principal debtor and surety emphasized); Albion
State Bank v. Knickerbocker, (1900) 125 Mich. 311, 314, 84 N. W. 311, 313
(same, although the securities were construed to have been given for the
payment of the principal obligations) ; Meeker v. Waldron, (1901) 62 Neb.
689, 694-695, 87 N. W. 539, 541 (some emphasis upon surety's insolvency) ;
Keene Five Cents Savings Bank v. Herrick, (1882) 62 N. I. 174, 177: "In
this case it appears that the principal debtor and the sureties are all
insolvent, and under such circumstances the creditor, according to all
the authorities, is entitled to the benefit of the security held by the sureties;" ljames v. Gaither, (1885) 93 N. C. 358, 362-364 (insolvency of
both principal debtor and surety emphasized) ; Ohio Life Ins. & Trust
Co. v. Reeder, (1849) 18 Ohio 35, 46-47 (insolvency of principal debtor
apparently thought necessary) ; Brown & Heywood Co. v. Ligon, (C.C.
Mo. 1899) 92 Fed. 851, 856 (presence of same factor emphasized) ; Mathews
v. Abbott, (D.C. Me. 1878) 2 Hask. 289, Fed. Cas. No. 9,275 (insolvency
of both principal debtor and surety apparently thought necessary). III
Willard, Right of a Creditor to His Sureties' Securities, (1880) 14 Am. L.
Rev. 839, 857, the author's contention is that the creditor's equity should
first arise out of the fact of the surety's insolvency; and in Scott, The
Creditor's Right to Subject the Securities of the Surety When They
Purport to be for Indemnity Merely, (1885) 19 Am. L. Rev. 867, 877,
the insolvency of both principal debtor and surety is emphasized as operating
"inequitably, to the obstruction of his [the creditor's] legal remedies."
le3See Osborn v. Noble. (1872) 46 Miss. 449, 454-455: "If a mortgage
or other security is given to the surety, not to secure the debt or to provide
a fund for its payment, but to save harmless from a contingent liability
or loss, that contingency must come. or the injury be sustained before a
right to the indemnity inures to the creditor. Where the contract is for the
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ently realizable rights in the securities given for his indemnification, by virtue of his not yet having been daniified within the
terms of the security agreement, the supreme court of Mississippi
has expressly denied that the fact of anyone's insolvency is at all
material for the purpose of creating rights in the creditor that
would not otherwise exist. Thus in Bush v. Stanps,10' in which
both the principal debtor and the surety were discharged bankrupts, it was held that
"Shelby [the surety] had no right, before his bankruptcy, to order
the trustees to sell the property under the deed, and that the
creditor must be confined to the rights which Shelby then had."
And in Pool v. Dosterea the same court stated:
"In none of our cases is any mention made of the insolvency
of the surety to whom a security for his indemnity was given as
affecting the rights of the parties. : . . Upon the principle of our
cases as to securities as mere indennity to the surety, his supervening insolvency could not create a right in the creditor which
he would not otherwise have to resort to the security given to the
surety."
Certainly it is not readily apparent why the insolvency of
either the principal debtor or the surety. or of both, should be the
point of significance in creating rights in the creditor that would
not otherwise exist, with the effect of giving him a preference
in the securities at the very time that their appropriation exclsivelv to him first becomes prejudicial to others. The analogy of
the "rule of Ex parte Waring" has no doubt had some influence
upon the American courts; and of course, to a court that feels that
the creditor's remedies at law should be shown to be inadequate
before permitting him to proceed against the securities, the insolvency of the principal debtor or the surety, or of both, might
be used to supply the necessary inadequacy of the legal remedies.",8
personal benefit of the surety, in opposition to the idea of a pledge for

the debt. or providing means for its payment, the creditor can claim only
such rights and remedies as the surety had. If he has not been damnified,
and the conditions of the mortgage or other contract of indemnity are
unbroken, the surety himself could assert no remedy, nor could the creditor
claiming
4 through him and in his stead have substitution."
1G
(1853) 26 Miss. 463, 467.
16-(1881) 59 -Miss. 258, 262-263.
6
IG In
Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Reeder. (1849) 18 Ohio 35.
46-48, the court apparently thought it necessary, both that the principal
debtor be insolvent, and that judgment already have been rendered against
the surety with execution thereon returned unsatisfied, for the purpose
of showing the inadequacy of the creditor's legal remedies: "The substitution of a creditor, to the indemnities of the surety, is a high exercise
of chancery powers, and will not be resorted to unless in cases where the
ordinary remedies have failed." See also Scott. The Creditor's Right to
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But even so, such inadequacy of the legal remedies is not of itself
a sufficient ground in equity for the creation of new substantive
rights that would not otherwise exist; and insolvency as a form
of inadequacy of the legal remedies is not ordinarily a basis for
the creation of preference rights.G, It would seem instead, without the aid of further principles yet to be developed, that in the
circumstances in which the fact of insolvency becomes at all material, it should work in exactly the opposite direction-that is,
with the effect of barring whatever direct rights might otherwise
be held to lie in the particular creditor for the purpose of preventing needless circuity or multiplicity of actions.
If the principal debtor alone is insolvent, that fact should
have no effect at all upon whatever rights in the creditor would
otherwise be held to exist, since the surety's preference right in
the securities is still a presently realizahle asset of his estate, as
available as any other to execution by the particular creditor.
Similarly the surety's insolvency, to the extent that it is not accompanied by a forced judicial administration of his estate and
does not preclude a race in diligence among his creditors for the
appropriation of his assets, should not have the effect of barring
rights of the particular creditor in the securities that he would
otherwise be held to have. In a situation in which the surety alone
is insolvent and the securities are sufficient for the payment in
full of the principal obligation, it is equally apparent that no one
will be injured by the appropriation of the securities to the payment of that obligation; and this would seem likewise to be true
wherever, both the principal debtor and the surety being insolvent
and the securities being sufficient for the payment in full of the
principal obligation, the particular creditor might also receive payment in full by proving against both insolvent estates. 08
But to the extent that it has become certain because of his insolvency that he will not be called upon to respond in .full to his
liability under the principal obligation, it would seem that the
surety has not been damnified;'O and to the extent that he has
Subject te Securities of the Surety When They Purport to be for Indemnity
(1885) 19 Am. L. Rev. 867, 877.
Merely,
6
1 7See

McClintock, Handbook of Equity 68: "Where the granting of

specific relief against an insolvent defendant would give plaintiff a preference
over other creditors to which he is not equitably entitled, relief may be
refused for that reason, though it be admitted that the remedy at law is
inadequate."
looSee above, text at note 54.
169Though compare Johnson v. Martin, (1915) 83 Wash. 364, 145 Pac.
429, 432: "This case being between the principal debtor and the creditor
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not been damnified he has himself no presently realizable asset in
the securities, available, under the subrogation theory, to execution
by the particular creditor. And once damnification has occurred
in the form of dividends declared from the surety's other assets
in favor of the particular creditor, it would seem that his interest
in the indemnifying securities should become presently realizable
for the benefit of his other general creditors as well as the particular one. Without the aid of further principles yet to be developed, it would seem that the only logical application that can
be made of the fact of the surety's insolvency by courts purporting
to follow the subrogation the6ry should be to preclude rights that
might otherwise be held to exist in the particular creditor-because
of the surety's lack of damnification-rather than to create them.
To this extent the subrogation theory, standing alone, breaks down,
and is impeded rather than aided by the fact of the surety's insolvency.
If it be assumed that both the principal debtor and the surety
are insolvent, and that the particular creditor would be unable to
receive payment in full by proving against both estates, it also
follows that such creditor may be given a preference over the
other unsecured creditors of the principal debtor, to whose estate
any excess of the securities over the amount necessary for the
surety's indemnification is assumed to belong. 7 ' Why a preferential equity in the securities should first arise in the creditor by
virtue of the very circumstances in which others may be thereby
prejudiced would seem, offhand, to be beyond comprehension. It
should be noted that the American cases attributing significance to
the fact of the insolvency of the principal debtor or the surety, or
of both, although no doubt, influenced by it, have not expressly
adopted the rationale of the "rule of Ex parte Waring," with its
limitations.
But it is equally obvious that the very circumstances of both
the principal debtor's and the surety's insolvency are usually the
motivating factors from the creditor's point of view in seeking to
proceed in equity directly against the securities; and it is believed
that it may be safely assumed that in most of the cases according to
on the contract and the bond, it can make no difference whether the surety
has discharged its obligation (suffered loss or damage) or not; for equity
will treat it as discharged in virtue of the insolvency of the surety, and
will make all assets in its hands available for the discharge of the principal

debt."
17OSee above, text at notes 54 and 55.
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the creditor preferential rights in the securities the parties personally liable were in fact insolvent. This raises the question
whether it may not be only the subrogation theory that is deficient.
rather than that the result achieved is unsound, and whether there
may not be still some other basis for according to the particular
creditor paramount rights, even in merely indennifying securities,
that the circumstances of insolvency do not affect. It has been
said that
"The great weight of authority .. .is against the proposition,
that the creditor's right is rooted in the doctrine of subrogation.
• ..The clear deduction from the cases is, that, an assignment of
the securities by the principal to his surety for indeniity merely,
raises an implied trust in favor of the creditor, which, on maturity
of his debt, he may enforce, whether the surety has been daniified
or not, and irrespective of the question whether
the surety or the
7
principal, either or both, are insolvent."' '1
.\n impressive number of American cases reach the trust result regardless of whether the securities were specifically approl)riated to the payment of the principal indebtedness or were given
17 1Morrill v. Morrill, (1880) 53 Vt. 74, 80-81, 38 Am. St. Rep. 659,
660. The court also stated: "The assignment of security by the principal to his surety is an appropriation of funds for the ultimate discharge of
the debt, for which he is holden. The surety has the right to apply the
security directly to the payment of the debt. If the surety pays with
his own funds, he keeps his principal's debt on foot against him, and
then applies the security to its payment. Thus in any event the funds
of the principal are made to satisfy the principal's debt, and this accords
with the purpose of the principal, when he gave the security. . . . Here
the principal and surety are both insolvent, and the liability of the surety
has been fixed by judgment; but we regard these facts as important, only
as they seem to intensify the equity of the oratrix."
See also Swift & Company v. Kortrecht, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1900) 112
Fed. 709, 714: "The rule has long been settled that all securities given
by the debtor for the payment of his debt inure to the benefit of the
creditor. It is not necessary that they be given directly to the creditor
or in express terms contain an agreement to pay the debt. If given to
a surety to secure him, equity treats it as collateral to the debt. Some
of the decided cases suggest a distinction which would exclude from the
operation of the rule those cases where the language of the securing
instrument indicates only a purpose to indemnify a surety, and does riot
indicate any agreement to pay the principal debt. But it does not appear
to us that there is any solid ground for this distinction. It rests upon
the idea that the creditor's right can be no larger than that of the surety.
which is measured by the terms of his security. But, when the debtor procures his surety to become liable for the debt, an implied obligation immediately falls upon the debtor to pay the debt himself. And this obligation
is of so distinct and positive a character that, if the debtor fails to meet
it,the surety may file a bill in equity to compel him to do so. . . . The
obligation is equally effective as if it were literally expressed. Iow else
shall the debtor save his surety harmless than by satisfying the obligation?
There is therefore no enlargement of the debtor's obligation by subrogation
of the creditor."
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merely for the surety's personal indemnification; although it is
believed to be impossible to determine the actual numerical weight
of authority, owing to the generality of the language used by the
courts, to the existence of inconsistent utterances by courts of the
same jurisdiction, and to the unemphasized presence, in many
cases using broad language, of the same factors thought by other
courts to be indicative of a specific appropriation of the securities
to the payment of the principal indebtedncss. Such cases have
held that securities given merely for the sur.ety's personal indemnification may nevertheless be appropriated by the creditor to
the exclusion of the surety, even though the surety has not yet
been damnified and has himself no presently realizable interest in
the securities, and regardless of the possibilities of prejudice to
the surety or to the principal debtor's other creditors or to both.'"
The Kentucky cases, originally emphasizing the significance of the
securities having been specifically appropriated to tile payment
of the principal obligation, have more recently been tending to
hold that "A security given by the principal debtor to his surety is
a security for the debt, as well as the ultimate protection of the
surety, and operates eo instanti for the benefit of the creditor.'"
1?72Harlan County v. Whitney, (1902) 65 Neb. 105, 107, 90 N. V. 993;
Fields v. Letcher State Bank, (1934) 256 Ky. 592, 594, 76 S. W. (2d) 908.

909.
'73Alexander v. West, (1931) 241 Ky. 541, 545, 44 S. W. (2d) 518. 520
(italics supplied). See also Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Combs, (1933)
251 Ky. 540, 545, 65 S. W. (2d) 696, 698; Fields v. Letcher State Bank.
(1934) 256 Ky. 592, 594, 76 S. W. (2d) 908, 909.
The following cases appear by their language to lend further support
to the broader doctrine announced by the cases already cited in notes 171173 inclusive: Whitehead v. Henderson, (1899) 67 Ark. 200, 205, 56 S. W.
1065, 1067; Van Orden v. Durham, (1868) 35 Cal. 136, 145-147; Belcher v.
The Hartford Bank, (1843) 15 Conn. 381, 383; Plaut v. Storey, (1891) 131
Ind. 46, 49-50, 30 N. E. 886, 887; Seibert v. True, (1871) 8 Kan. 52, 63;
In re Jerome B. Fickett, (1881) 72 Me. 266, 267-268; Owens v. Miller &
Mayhew, (1868) 29 Md. 144, 161; Boyd v. Parker & Co., (1875) 43 Nid. 182,
199-200; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Trimble, (1878) 51 Md. 99, 113-114;
Union Nat'l Bank v. Rasch, (1895) 106 Mich. 319, 328, 64 N. W. 339, 342;
Union Nat'l Bank v. Rich, (1898) 116 Mich. 414, 416-417, 74 N. W. 659, 660 ;
Lindsay v. Morse, (1902) 129 Mich. 350, 353, 88 N. W. 881, 882; Haven
v. Foley & Papin, (1853) 18 Mo. 136, 139; Thornton v. National Exchange
Bank, (1878) 71 Mo. 221, 232; O'Neill v. State Savings Bank, (1906) 34
Mont. 521, 87. Pac. 970, 971; Richards v. Yoder, (1880) 10 Neb. 429, 432. 6
N. W. 629, 630; Holt v. Penacook Savings Bank, (1883) 62 N. H. 551, 553;
Barton v. Croyden, (1885) 63 N. H. 417, 418; People v. Metropolitan
Surety Co., (1911) 148 App. Div. 503, 132 N. Y. S. 829, 831; People v.
Metropolitan Surety Co., (1911) 148 App. Div. 512, 132 N. Y. S. 835, 836,
aff'd, People v. Metropolitan Surety Co., (1912) 205 N. Y. 135, 98 N. V.
412; Sexton v. Fensterer, (1913) 154 App. Div. 542, 139 N. Y. S. 811,
816-817, aff'd, Sexton v. Fensterer, (1914) 213 N. Y. 641, 107 N. E. 1085;
Matthews v. Joyce, (1881) 85 N. C. 258, 266; Ijames v. Gaither, (1885)
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If such cases are based only 'upon false precedent and unsound
reasoning, at least the names of Pound' 7 ' and Smith
those of Kent and Story among the ones deceived.

75

have joined

It is believed that Dean Arant weakened the force of his argument against a creditor's rights in merely indemnifying securities
when he conceded it to be unquestionable that an interest in the

creditor should be recognized whenever "the security is given
T
Fol
for the expressed purpose of paying the debt due him.'
even in such cases it is submitted that the primary object of the
parties to the security transaction is normally to secure the surety
rather than the creditor, and to give the surety rather than the
creditor control over the realization of the securities.' 7 Else why
were not the securities given directly to the creditor in the first
place? He chose rather to rely for his security upon the surcty's
solvency, and to the extent that his reliance was misplaced it is
not for courts of equity, for that reason alone, to make a new
and better bargain for him upon the pretext of a presumed intent
found in the security instrument.'7 8 The specious character of
the factors emphasized by so many American courts in finding the
securities to have been specifically appropriated to the payment of
the principal obligation, as distinguished from the purpose of
merely personal indemnity to the surety, has already been noted.'
In other words, the results reached by practically all of the
American courts, if sound, have yet to be explained upon some
common ground other than either the theory of subrogation or

S. E. 1035-1036; Green v. Dodge and Cogswell, (1834) 6 Ohio 80, 85.
25 Am. Dec. 736, 740; Kramner v. Farmers & Merchants' Bank of Steubenville, (1846) 15 Ohio 254, 262-263; Pendery v. Allen, (1893) 50 Ohio
St. 121, 130-132, 33 N. E. 716, 718-719; Kramer & Rahm's Appeal. (1860)
37 Pa. St. 71, 76-77; Field v. Pelot, (1842) MeMullan (S.C.) 370, 378379; Breedlove v. Stump, (1830) 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 257, 262-264; Kinsey
v. McDearmon, (1868) 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 392, 395-396; McRady v.
Thomas, (1885) 16 Lea. (Tenn.) 173, 175: Magill v. Brown, (1899)
20 Tex. Civ. App. 662. 675, 50 S.W. 143, 150; Reed v. Continental State
Bank of Beckville, (Tex. Civ. App., 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 426, 428-429;
Hauser v. King, (1882) 76 Va. 731, 733-734; Johnson v. Martin, (1915)
83 Wash. 364, 145 Pac. 429, 431-433; Haynes v. United States Fid. & G,
Co.. (D.C. Okla. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 272, 275.
93 N. C. 358, 362-364; Blanton v. Bostic, (1900) 126 N. C. 418, 421, 35
174In Harlan County v. Whitney, (1902) 65 Neb. 105, 90 N. W. 993.
175
1n Holt v. Penacook Savings Bank, (1883) 62 N. H. 551.
17 6Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 371.
1TTSee Eastman v. Foster, (1844) 8 Metc. (Mass.) 19, discussed in
notes 95 and 116, above.
2S8Compare Fertig v. Henne, (1901) 197 Pa. St. 560, 567, 47 Atl. 840:
"His [the surety's] solvency was and continues to be the creditor's security." 7 9
' 5ee above, pp. 346-348 of the text.
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the theory of a trust having been intended for the creditor's benefit,
standing alone.
There is another doctrine of bankruptcy and of equity which
forbids a surety, who has only partially performed his obligation
to the creditor, to prove his claim for reimbursement against the
insolvent principal's estate in competition with the creditor until
the latter has been fully paid.180 The Supreme Court of the
United States has held this doctrine to be equally applicable to
the case of a surety for only a part of the principal indebtedness
who has fully performed to the extent of his own obligation.,
"The rule is the same, and for like reasons, where the basis of
the claim is the debtor's promise to indemnify, if the debtor is
insolvent when the promise is enforced." 18a 2 And according to
Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for a unanimous court in Jenkins v.
NationalSurety Company :'63
"Similar reasoning underlies the requirement of equity that
the surety who holds the security of an insolvent debtor must
give the benefit of it to the creditor for whom he is surety, until
the debt is fully paid."
In the case of American Surety Company of New York v.
Westinghouse Electric Manufacturing Company"' decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1935, one Gray had entered
into a contract with the United States for the drilling of a well
at the Naval Air Station at Pensacola, Florida, for a total contract price of $13,133.36. To secure performance on his part
a bond was executed by Gray as principal and the American Surety
Company as surety, in the penal sum of $3,940. Payments towards
the contract price were to be made in accordance with approved
estimates as the work progressed, but the contracting officer was
required to retain ten per cent of the amount of the estimates
"until final completion and acceptance of all work covered by
the contract." Gray completed the work as required by the contract, but went into bankruptcy without having paid all the
' 8°See 4 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed., 36343635, 3639.
28'United States v. National Surety Co., (1920) 254 U. S. 73, 76, 41
Sup. Ct. 29, 30, 65 L. Ed. 143; Jenkins v. National Surety Co., (1928) 277
U. S.258, 266-267, 48 Sup. Ct. 445, 447, 72 L. Ed. 874; American Surety
Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co., (1935) 296 U. S. 133, 137, 56 Sup.
Ct. 9, 11, 80 L. Ed. 105; see also First Nat'!l Co. v. State-Planters Bank &
Trust Co., (1936) 164 Va. 491, 503-506, 180 S.E.281, 285-286.
182American Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg.

Co., (1935)

296 U. S.133, 137, 56 Sup. Ct. 9, 11, 80 L. Ed. 105.
283(1928) 277 U. S.258, 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 445, 447, 72 L Ed. 874.
21(1935) 296 U. S.133, 56 Sup. Ct. 9, 80 L. Ed. 105.
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persons furnishing labor and materials who were held to fall
within the protection of the bond.' 5 The surety company thereupon paid the full amount for which it was liable, which was
ihsufficient, however, to satisfy the claims of the obligees of the
bond. The controversy in the case was between the surety company and the obligees of the bond with respect to the sun of
$2,724.23, which represented the ten per cent of the estimates as
the work progressed that had been retained by the contracting
officer in accordance with the terms of the contract. The surety

company claimed this amount by way of stbrogation to the
rights of the laborers and materialmen to whom it had paid the
full amount of its bond,"' and also by virtue of a covenant of
indemnity received from Gray which the court astumted amounted
.to a specific appropriation of the percentages reserved or of any
other assets." The Supreme Court not only rejected the surety
companys claim to the entire amount, but also refused to permit
it to participate ratably therein, in competition with the laborers and
materialmen who had not yet received payment of their claims
in full. Mr. Justice Roberts alone dissented, contending that
the surety company should be permitted to share ratably.

In the majority opinion Mr. Justice Cardozo, after calling
attention to the principles just stated, quoted from Jenkins v.
National Surety Company' ST as follows:
185"Laborers and materialmen, together with the government, are ohligees or beneficiaries of a bond so given (Equitable Surety Co. v. United
States, (1914) 234 U. S. 448, 34 Sup. Ct. 803, 58 L. Ed. 1394; Illinois
Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., (1917) 244 U. S. 376, 37 Sup. Ct. 614. 61 L.
Ed. 1206; Brogan v. National Surety Co., (1918) 246 U. S. 257, 38 Sup. Ct.
250, 62 L. Ed. 703, L. R. A. 1918D 776), though the claims, if any, of the
government are to have priority of payment."
American Surety Co. v.
Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co., (1935) 296 U. S. 133, 135, 56 Sup. Ct
9, 10, 80 L. Ed. 105.
lseSee Henningsen v. United States Fid. & G. Co., (1908) 208 U. S
404, 28 Sup. Ct. 389, 52 L. Ed. 547. But much confusion has arisen from the
fact that, in deciding that case, "the Supreme Court did not make it clear
whether the surety, who had paid labor and material claims and whose
rights were held to be superior to those of a general creditor holding
an assignment from the contractor, was subrogated to the rights of laborers
and materialmen or subrogated to the rights of the contractor as of the
time the bond was written, and whether, if the surety was subrogated to
the rights of laborers and materialmen, such rights extended beyond
retained percentages and included all deferred payments due upon the completion of the contract. It is to be hoped that in a proper case the Supreme
Court will take occasion to clarify the situation, so that itmay be definitely
known what equitable rights laborers and materialmen have in addition to
their rights under a public contractor's bond, and whether such rights, if
any, are-limited to retained percentages or apply to progressive payments as
well." Sanborn, J., in Martin v. National Surety Co.. (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1936) 85 Fed. (2d) 135, 140.
187(1928) 277 U. S. 258, 267, 48 Sup. Ct. 445, 447. 72 L. Ed. 874.
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"Wherever equitable principles are called in play, as they preeminently are in determining the rights and liabilities of sureties
and in the distribution of insolvents' estates, they likewise forbid
the surety to secure by independent contract with the debtor
indemnity at the expense of the creditor whose claim he has
undertaken to secure."
He then continued:
"This is surely so unless the contract of indemnity has the
effect of a specific lien.... We are told in effect that the displace-

ment.of a lien is an exercise of power more drastic and far-reaching
than the marshalling of assets where there has been no agreement
for a lien. The distinction might be important if the contest were
between the surety and creditors not covered by the bond or
between the surety and later assignees of the security so promised.
• . . Such is not the situation here, even though we assume in
aid of the petitioner that the promise to indemnify, obscure in its
terms, is to be read as amounting to a specific appropriation of
the percentages reserved or of any other assets. The contest in
this cause is between the surety on the one hand and on the other
hand creditors of the class it has undertaken to protect."'18 8

It is true that Mr. Justice Cardozo also emphasized that the
bond involved was one required by law, and added: "What considerations may govern after payment of the penalty in full where
the bond is altogether a voluntary security we do not need to
inquire." And he might well have further emphasized that the
effect of the legal requirement of withholding ten per cent of the
payments toward the contract price until final completion of
the work was really to impose a trust upon the funds thus withheld, for the benefit of the laborers and materialmen, prior in
point of time to the lien upon the same funds given by the principal obligor to the surety by way of indemnity. 89 But the
rationale of the decision was in no way made to depend upon the
latter proposition. And after calling attention to a group of
cases involving the problem of the rights of creditors in their
sureties' indemnifying securities, Mr. Justice Cardozo emphasized
that such cases, "though they suggest an analogy, do not control
[in the solution of the problem before the court], even in
principle, for there the surety wtlas in default upon his obligatimo
to the creditor."190 Certainly the ground upon which Mr. Justice
188(1935) 296 U. S. 133, 138, 56 Sup. Ct. 9, 11, 80 L Ed. 105.
89

' See note 186, above.
290(1935) 296 U. S. 133, 139, 56 Sup. Ct. 9, 12, 80 L Ed. 105 (italics
supplied). The cases cited were Keller v. Ashford, (1890) 133 U. S.
610, 10 Sup. Ct. 494, 33 L. Ed. 667; Hampton v. Phipps, (1882) 108 U. S.
260, 2 Sup. Ct. 622, 27 L. Ed. 719; and Moses v. Murgatroyd, (1814) 1
Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 119.
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Cardozo thus distinguished the cases of the type now under
consideration should logically make the rationale of his opinion
still more rather than less applicable in the solution of the problem
of those cases than of the one immediately before the court.
Though it may appear so offhand, we have not thus been
brought back after all to a proposition that the insolvency of the
principal debtor is the point of significance at which the creditor's
rights in the surety's indemnifying securities first arise. Obviously it is not the insolvency of the principal debtor, operating
through the principle of non-competition by the surety with the
as yet unpaid creditor, in assets emanating from the insolvent
principal debtor, that first gives rise to such rights; for the
principle of non-competition would not alone be sufficient to
give to the particular creditor a preference in the securities
ahead of the principal debtor's other general creditors besides the
surety. Rather the creditor's interest must have arisen prior to
the insolvency of the principal debtor, either through the surety
or independently of him, and the significance of the principle of
non-competition by the surety in assets emanating from the
insolvent principal debtor is to remove the objection of prejudice
to the surety, or to the principal debtor's other creditors, or to
both, that might otherwise arise. The non-competitive principle
is supplementary rather than 6f itself the creative origin of the
creditor's rights.
By hypothesis the surety has himself a preference right in the
securities ahead of the principal debtor's other creditors, so that
the securities are beyond the reach of execution by them.'," To
the extent that the surety has himself a presently realizable right
in the securities, the principal debtor's other creditors will not be
further harmed by the enforcement of the surety's own right, with
the proceeds passing exclusively to the particular creditor by
virtue of the non-competitive principle. To hold otherwise would
be either to destroy the non-competitive principle or else the
security agreement, restoring the securities to the principal debtor's
general assets, and there is no proper basis for doing either. Nor
have the surety's own other creditors any higher rights than the
191"When the surety receives security from his principal for the expressed purpose of indemnifying him against loss, he is in the same position
as one who is given a mortgage to secure future advances but, as yet, has
made none. No one else can acquire a superior claim to the property
mortgaged, but, if no advances are ever made, the mortgagee has no enforceable interest in it." Arant, Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and
Guaranty 371.
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surety himself. And if the surety is himself also insolvent, so
that he has not as yet been fully damnified, it nevertheless follows
that as rapidly as he is damnified in the form of dividends declared
from his other assets in favor of the particular creditor, the
non-competitive principle still requires that his now available
right of reimbursement from the securities be exercised exclusively
in favor of the particular creditor until the latter has received
payment in full, rather than that it become an asset of the surety's
estate for general distribution among all his creditors as under
192
the Scottish rule.
The non-competitive principle does not cease to operate by
virtue of the surety's own insolvency. Furthermore, by virtue
of the surety's inability to compete with the particular creditor
in the proceeds of the securities until the latter has received payment in full, it follows that despite the realization of the securities
to the extent of the surety's damnification he nevertheless remains
still damnified in the same amount, which effectively prevents the
restoration of the securities to the principal debtor's general
assets. The surety's presently realizable interest in the securities,
to the extent of his damnification, is therefore not exhausted by a
single exercise in favor of the particular creditor. It is simpler
to appropriate them from the beginning to the payment in full
of the particular creditor, or to the extent that they are sufficient
for that purpose, thus satisfying at the same time the surety's
own right of exoneration, and restoring any excess to the
principal debtor's general assets.
In other words, owing both to the availability of the surety's
own interest in the indemnifying securities to execution in favor
of the particular creditor, and to the non-competitive principle,
the very nature of a surety's indemnifying securities received from
the principal debtor is such as effectively to prevent the surety
from having exclusive control over the realization of the securities for his own benefit and that of his other general creditors until
the particular creditor has received payment in full of the principal
obligation. By virtue of the intent of the indemnifying agreement, thy may not be restored to the principal debtor's general
assets until either the surety has been relieved of risk or they have
served their purpose of the surety's indemnification, which, however, by the operation of equitable principles, may not be accomplished over the proper assertion of the particular creditor's interest, until the latter has been paid in full.
192See above, pp. 336-339 of the text.
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Professor Williston has concluded, although withodt adequately
setting forth the reasoning upon which his conclusion is based,
that
"if the agreement . . . is interpreted as not precluding the

surety from exonerating himself by resort to the security, then
the creditor should be entitled to the security irrespective of the
surety's solvency or insolvency, and in the latter event in priority
1 3
to his general creditors.""
On the hypothesis that the creditor's right is strictly "derivative," however, he also contends that if the security agreement
"is interpreted as limiting the surety to reimbursement for loss
suffered, no right should accrue to the creditor."194
But the reasoning already advanced is believed equally to
sustain, under most circumstances, the existence of rights in the
creditor in the latter situation when once "loss," in whatever
form, is held to have been suffered by the surety. For even in
that situation, the surety's right to recoup from the securities the
amount of his loss already suffered is still a presently realizable
asset of the surety, available to the exclusive appropriation by the
particular creditor at least to the extent that by a race in diligenice
he is able to secure priority over the surety's other creditors.
And once the principal debtor has become insolvent, the noncompetitive principle comes into operation to prevent recoupnent
from the securities by the surety or his other creditors for the
loss already suffered, until after the particular creditor has been
paid in full. Only where the principal debtor is not insolvent,
and the surety's other creditors have by prior action secured
priority in the surety's right to recoup from the securities the
amount of his loss already suffered, or else have secured equal
rights therein by virtue of the forced administration of the surety's
own estate, is the second statement quoted from Professor
Williston believed to be a necessary logical consequence of his
"derivative right" hypothesis.
The theory of the creditor's so-called subrogation, and the
non-competitive principle, are together believed to be sufficient
to sustain the results reached by a decided majority of the
American cases upon their specific facts, since in most of them
the principal debtor may be assumed to have been insolvent. The
courts achieving the trust result in cases of merely indemnifying
securities have emphasized the factor of the securities having
1934
1944

Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed., 3624-3625.
Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed.. 3624.
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emanated from the principal debtor and thereby having depleted
assets to which the particular creditor is equitably entitled in
preference to the surety ;19 and they have for the most part refused
to reach the same result in cases of indemnifying securities furnished by a stranger to the principal obligation, in which the noncompetitive principle is lacking. 96 But to the extent that co-sureties
are each liable for the full amount of the principal obligation,
so that the non-competitive principle becomes applicable to one
co-surety's right of contribution from the insolvent estate of
another, it would seem to be erroneous to treat indemnifying
securities given by one co-surety to another the same as though
given by a stranger to the principal obligation.197 The creditor's
right to indemnifying securities furnished to a surety by one
who is himself fully liable for the principal obligation, even
though it be regarded as derivative, is nevertheless, because of
the non-competitive principle, a right of a much higher order
than, and paramount to, the right of one co-surety to the benefit
of a ratable proportion of indemnifying securities furnished by
the principal debtor to another co-surety;19s although the two
' 95 Union' Nat'l Bank v. Rasch, (1895) 106 Mich. 319, 328, 64 N. W.
339, 342; Meeker v. Waldron, (1901) 62 Neb. 689, 694-696, 87 N. W. 539,
541; Keene Five Cents Savings Bank v. Herrick, (1882) 62 N. H. 174, 175;
Price v. Trusdell, (1877) 28 N. J. Eq. 200, 203-205; Ijames v. Gaither,
(1885) 93 N. C. 358, 362-364; Breedlove v. Stump, (1830) 3 Yerg. (Tenn.)
257, 262-264; Hauser v. King, (1882) 76 Va. 731, 733-734; Johnson v.
Martin, (1915) 83 Wash. 364, 145 Pac. 429, 430-433.
' 9 GTaylor v. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky, (1888) 87 Ky. 398, 9 S. W.
240; Black v. Kaiser, (1891) 91 Ky. 422, 16 S. W. 89; Clay v. Freeman,
(1896) 74 Miss. 816, 20 So. 871; O'Neill v. State Savings Bank, (1906) 34
Mont. 521, 87 Pac. 970; Hasbrouck v. Carr, (1914) 19 N. M. 586, 145
Pac. 133; Morgan v. Francklyn and Butler, (1873) 55 How. Pr. (N.Y.)
244; Henderson-Achert Lithographic Co. v. John Shillito Co., (1901) 64
Ohio St. 236, 60 N. E. 295; Hampton v. Phipps, (1883) 108 U. S. 260,
2 Sup. Ct. 662, 27 L. Ed. 719 (securities furnished to one co-surety by
another).
But compare Magoffin v. Boyle Nat'l Bank of Danville, (1902) 24 Ky.
L. Rep. 585, 69 S. W. 702; -Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Combs. (1933)
251 Ky. 540, 65 S. W. (2d) 696; Fields v. Letcher State Bank, (1934) 256
Ky. 592, 76 S. W. (2d) 908; King v. Harman's Heirs, (1834) 6 La. 607,
26 Am. Dec. 485; Brown & Heywood Co. v. Ligon, (C.C. Mo. 1899) 92
Fed. 851.
197As was done by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hampton
v. Phipps, (1883) 108 U. S. 260, 2 Sup. CL 622, 27 L. Ed. 719; contra,
supporting the statement in the text, Seward v. Huntington, (1882) 26
Hun (N.Y.) 217. On the strict subrogation theory, the decision in Hampton
v. Phipps may no doubt be supported by the fact that the right of each
co-surety to realize upon the securities given to him by the other depended
upon his having paid more than one-half of the principal obligation, which
contingency had not occurred and could not occur because of the insolvency
of both sureties.
' 98The paramount character of the creditor's right over that of a
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rights are frequently linked together as though having the same
99
P
basis and being of equal extent.
There remains only the final question whether there may not
be justification for giving to the creditor a direct rather than a
strictly derivative right in indemnifying securities received by the
surety from the principal debtor, which the surety may not at any
time destroy without the concurrence of the creditor, even prior
to damnification or loss having been suffered and while his own
interest in the securities is still contingent. If the analogy of the
surety's own subrogation, upon payment by him of the principal
obligation, to the benefit of securities held by the creditor, were
to be regarded as strictly applicable in the converse situation of
indemnifying securities held by the surety, it would seem arguable
that the surety ought not to be permitted to impair the creditor's
interest in the surety's securities, even though derivative and still
contingent, any more than is the creditor permitted to impair the
surety's interest in the creditor's securities, which is equally
derivative and still contingent, without thereby releasing the
surety from his personal liability upon the principal obligation.
In both situations the interest of the one in securities held by the
other is the result of the operation of equitable principles rather
than of the intent of the parties to the security agreement, and
in both it would seem that the principles capable of creating the
interest in the first place should retain sufficient vitality to prevent
its impairment. It has already been suggested that there was
no inherent necessity of equity's according to a surety, who is
unsecured in his right of reimbursement from the principal
debtor, the benefit of the creditor's own preferences at the expense
of junior encumbrancers 00 It all comes back in both situations
to a question of the proper basis and extent of the interest
originally created in the one in securities held by the other.
In the ordinary third-party-beneficiary situation Professors
Corbin and Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, representing the prevailing tendency of the American cases, have come at
least very close to recognizing the existence of direct rather than
strictly derivative rights in creditor- as well as donee-beneficico-surety appears to have been recognized by the court in Belcher v. The
Hartford Bank, (1843) 15 Conn. 381; and in Price v. Trusdell, (1877) 28
N. J. Eq. 200, the court appears to work out the co-surety's rights in
securities held by another co-surety indirectly by way of subrogation to the
creditor's rights.
199See Taylor v. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky, (1888) 87 Ky. 398, 402403, 9 S. W. 240, 241; see also note 3, above.
20oSee above, pp. 359-360 of the text.
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aries.20 ' This is certainly true to the extent that the promisee is
held unable to release the promisor from his obligation to the
creditor-beneficiary when once the latter has brought suit, or
relied upon it to his detriment, or the situation of the promisee
has become such as to render the release by him a fraud against
his creditors. 20 2 For it is thereby assumed that the beneficiary
has the right to bring suit, or otherwise to rely, upon the promise;
and unless the beneficiary has a direct rather than a strictly
derivative right, it is difficult to see why the promisee's circumstances being such as to render his release of any asset a fraud on
creditors, should result in the beneficiary's thereby being irrevocably enabled to recover more from the promisor than he might
recover upon his own original right against the promisee.
Also the restriction of the promisee's own right to enforce
the promise to the circumstances in which he has been compelled
to perform his own original obligation, or a part thereof, to the
beneficiary, and placing his own right upon a theory of subrogation to that of the beneficiary,- is a rather far step from a
strictly "derivative" right theory.20 3 Of course the creditor-beneficiary's rights are "derivative" in the sense that they arise out
of the third-party contract, and are subject to all conditions, express or implied, contained therein ;204 but in that sense of the term
the rights of a donee-beneficiary are equally "derivative." As to
the latter the Restatement in section 142 has adopted the view
that
20

'Professor Corbin has taken this position more emphatically than has
Professor Williston. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons.
(1918) 27 Yale L. J. 1008, 1022: "He gains this special right because
the contracting parties intended that he should have it, or at least that the
performance should go direct to him. To apply the 'equitable asset' theory
is merely to recognize the third party beneficiary's right under another and
mis-descriptive name." While Professor Williston has distinguished the
creditor- from the donee-beneficiary, on the ground that the former's right
is "purely derivative," see 2 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts.
rev. ed., 1144, it is believed from the context, and from some of the consequences that he attaches to the creditor's right, that by "purely derivative"
he means primarily that the creditor's right is derivative from the assumption
contract, and from the promisee's own right against the promisor, rather than
from the creditor's original right against the promisee through the equitable
execution theory. See also Restatement, Contracts, sees. 136, 140, 141, 143.
and 144.
202
Restatement, Contracts, sec. 143.
203
Restatement, Contracts, sec. 141.
204
Restatement, Contracts, sec. 140: "There can be no donee beneficiary or creditor beneficiary unless a contract has been formed between
a promisor and promisee; and if a contract is conditional, voidable, or
unenforceable at the time of its formation, or subsequently ceases to be
binding in whole or in part because of impossibility, illegality or the present
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"Unless the power to do so is reserved, the duty of the promisor
to'the donee beneficiary cannot be released by the promisee or
affected by any agreement between the promisee and the promisor."
In the ordinary third-party-beneficiary situation, as Professor
Williston has so aptly pointed out,
".. . it was no easier to find a principle requiring the promisee
to hold as trustee for the beneficiary what he recovered, and for
which he had paid the consideration, than to find a principle
allowing a direct recovery by the beneficiary against the promisor.
. . . The pressing necessity of the situation and the inherent
reasonableness of this solution has led the great majority of the
American courts frankly to recognize, as does the Restatement of
Contracts, that through this travail the common law has given
birth to a distinct, new principle of law which takes its own
place in the family of legal principles, and gives not only to a
donee beneficiary, but also to a creditor beneficiary, the right 20to
enforce directly the promise from which he derives his interest.1

1

It is believed that the above statement would be still more
apposite of the equitable principle enunciated by those cases reaching the result of a trust for the creditor's benefit in merely indemnifying securities received by the surety from the principal
debtor. It has already been seen that the indemnifying securities,
in the same sense as the promise to pay the debt of another, are
an asset of the surety's estate of a peculiar and unique characterpeculiar and unique in that their realization will necessarily redound to the benefit of the particular creditor, either directly, or
indirectly to the extent that the surety's realization of them for
his own exclusive benefit follows his already having paid such
creditor. It is true that in the ordinary third-party creditor-beneficiary situation the existence of direct rights in the beneficiary is
in no way complicated by the creation of any preferences, will ordinarily in no way prejudice the promisee, and is subject to any conditions, express or implied, contained in the agreement between the
promisor and the promisee. But the very nature of securities as
necessarily involving preferences, and the fundamental character
of the creditor-principal debtor-surety relation, are believed not
only to avoid the significance of these distinctions, but to place the
creditor's right to indemnifying securities received by the surety
from the principal debtor upon a still higher plane than the right
of the ordinary third-party creditor-beneficiary.
or prospective failure of the promisee to perform a return promise which
was the consideration for the promisor's promise, the right of a donee
beneficiary or creditor beneficiary under the contract is subject to the same
limitation."
2052 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed., 1049.
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"The integrity of that relation is in the keeping of the law."- 8
The duty of the surety not to do anything to impede the creditor
in the assertion of his remedies against the principal debtor, and
not to compete with the creditor by proof of his claim for reimbursement against the assets of an insolvent principal debtor,
brings the surety into a relation with the creditor very near to that
of a fiduciary.- The surety's unsecured right of reimbursement
from a still solvent principal debtor, that exists despite the fact
that the creditor has not yet been paid in full, is perhaps not at
all inconsistent with the integrity of that relation, since the creditor
might by prior action have secured payment in full from the principal debtor and may yet do so. Permitting the surety to assert
his right of reimbursement from a still solvent principal debtor
as soon as he has himself paid a part of the principal obligation encourages the surety to relieve the creditor of the burden of suit.
But in taking indemnifying securities from the principal debtor
the surety necessarily is contemplating the possibility of his unsecured right of reimbursement from the principal debtor proving
inadequate-a possibility which, however, if it eventuates before
the creditor has received payment in full, will likewise render
inadequate the latter's remedies against the principal debtor, and
will preclude the surety from competing with him in the principal
debtor's assets, including the indemnifying securities. The surety
is attempting permanently to withdraw the securities from the principal debtor's'assets available to execution by the creditor---and
he should be deemed fully cognizant of the fact that in the only
circumstances in which he will really need them before having
paid the creditor'in full, the latter will be to that extent impeded
in his remedies against the principal debtor and at the same time
entitled to freedom from competition from the surety's right of
reimbursement.
In other words, to use an undesirable adjective for the lack of
any better one, has not the surety perpetrated a form of "constructive" fraud, in the absence of the further factor of the full performance by him of his own obligation to the creditor? For the
absence of such further factor, which, if present, would relieve the
transaction of all possible objection, there is no sufficient legal
excuse other than the fact of the surety's own insolvency; and he
206Cardozo, J., in American
Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg.
Co., (1935) 296 U. S. 133, 139, 56 Sup. Ct. 9, 12, 80 L. Ed. 105. Compare
the unusual liberality of the courts in allowing rescission of suretyship
contracts for nondisclosure. See Patterson, Cases and Materials on
Contracts II, 163, note (3).
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would hardly stand in any stronger position for having contemplated the protection of his other creditors, at the expense of this
particular one, in the event of his own insolvency being superimposed upon the circumstances rendering it inequitable for him
to impede or compete with the latter in his remedies against the
principal debtor. It is no sufficient answer to such reasoning to
point out that had the surety not taken the indemnifying securities
the principal debtor would have remained free to appropriate them
to the benefit of someone else not standing in the relation of
surety to the particular creditor, to the exclusion of all possible
interest of the latter in them. The fact remains that the surety
has taken the securities for the purpose of protecting himself
against the very circumstances in which, unless the creditor has
been paid in full, the surety is required not to impede or compete
with him in his remedies against the principal debtor.
If the possibility of "constructive" fraud has been established,
it should follow that the circumstances in which the possibility
materializes give rise to a "constructive" trust in favor of the particular creditor, in no way dependent upon the specific intent of the
parties to the indemnifying agreement. Is it too much of a further step for equity to impose the "constructive" trust from the
very beginning, in order to prevent the conflict of interest from
so much as arising in the circumstances in which it will become
prejudicial to the creditor? There are other instances in the lawnotably in the law of corporate directors-in which the beneficiary
of a non-competitive although not fully fiduciary relation is held
entitled to the benefits of a violation of that relation, instead of
the violation itself being held to be completely void.207 It would
not be a satisfactory solution of the present problem to hold that
indemnifying securities may not be taken by a surety from one
who is himself directly liable to the creditor for the full amount
of the principal obligation, and therefore to avoid the security
transaction and restore the securities to the latter's general assets,
for that solution would also nullify the transaction's perfectly
legitimate purpose of securing the surety's indemnification after
the particular creditor has been paid in full. It is believed that
the most satisfactory method by which equity may vindicate its
principles is by decreeing direct and paramount rights in the securities to the particular creditor, from the moment they are taken
by the surety until the creditor has been paid in full.
207

See Riley, Corporation's Right to Profits Made by Directors, (1920)
4 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 513.
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In the third-party creditor-beneficiary situation the Restatement of Contracts has taken the view in section 136 (d) that,
except as modified by section 143, the "whole or partial satisfaction of the promisor's duty to the promisee in any other way
than by rendering the promised performance in whole or in part
does not limit the promisor's duty to the creditor beneficiary ;" and
in section 143 that
"A discharge of the promisor by the promisee in a contract or
a variation thereof by them is effective against a creditor beneficiary if,
(a) the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit upon the
promise or otherwise materially change his position in reliance
thereon before he knows of the discharge or variation, and
(b) the promisee's action is not a fraud on creditors."
The Restatement has also, however, taken the view in Section
141 (2) that the promisee's own right to enforce the promise is
dependent upon his right of reimbursement or subrogation in the
event that the creditor-beneficiary has partially or totally, as the
case may be, satisfied his claim "from assets of the promisee without resorting to the promisor's contract."
It is conceded to be arguable, in cases of indemnifying securities received by the surety from the principal debtor, that the
recognition of the creditor's paramount rights should depend upon
his own assertion of them. From this premise it could reasonably
be held to follow that the creditor's knowledge of the fact of the
securities having been taken, which the courts have generally held
to be unnecessary to the creation of his interest in them, -08 might
nevertheless, in conjunction with his failure to assert his interest,
be held to constitute a waiver of it-unless he is also held entitled
to rely upon the effect that the law attaches to the indemnifying
transaction in derogation of what he knows to have been the intent of the parties to it. It might also be held that the surety
should be permitted to resort to the securities for his own exdusive benefit to the extent that, by having partially paid the
creditor, he is entitled to present reimbursement from the assets
of a still solvent principal debtor. This would seem to sustain
the thought of some courts that up to the time of the principal
debtor's insolvency the surety may appropriate the securities exclusively to the purpose of his own reimbursement or release them
to the principal debtor as he sees fit.20 It would seem especially
20

BSee the cases cited in note 99, above.
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Dyer v. Jacoway, (1905) 76 Ark. 171, 176, 88 S. W. 901, 903; Jones

v. Quinnipiack Bank, -(1860) 29 Conn. 25, 46; Woodville v. Reed. (1866)

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

pertinent in the case of a surety who has paid an installment of a
principal obligation, the remainder of which is not yet in default;
and much more so in the case of a surety for only a part of the
principal obligation who has performed his own part in full, as to
whom it is not contended that the principles here developed have
any application in the absence of the further factor of the principal
debtor's insolvency.2 0 But for the surety under the circumstances
of his own default to release securities, destined by their very
nature to the particular creditor's benefit, partakes very much of
the character of a conveyance fraudulent as to that creditor.2"' It is
believed that the surety's right to release the securities or effect
with the principal debtor a novation in their purpose, if it be permissible under any circumstances, should in all events end upon
a default in the payment of the principal obligation at its maturity.
In cases -of merely indemnifying securities, even though not
basing the result upon the theory of a trust for the creditor's benefit having arisen, the courts have nevertheless generally held that
defenses personal to the surety, such as the expiration of the period
of limitations upon his own personal liability, may be raised, if at
all, in a proceeding by the creditor to appropriate the securities,
only by the surety himself.2 12 This is of course entirely consistent
with the rule to the effect that the surety is entitled to waive such
defenses personal to himself, and still be able to assert his right of
reimbursement from the principal debtor, provided that the liability of the latter has not also been discharged to the surety's
218
knowledge.
But since the rights of the creditor in the securities have a still
stronger basis than the rights of the creditor-beneficiary of a
third-party contract, it should follow with at least the same reason
as in the latter situation, that the surety should not even be permitted to raise such defenses personal to himself in respect of the
principal obligation, to the prejudice of the creditor's interest in
26 Md. 179, 191, doubted in Boyd v. Parker & Co., (1875) 43 Md. 182, 199200; McCracken v. German Fire Ins. Co., (1876) 43 Md. 471, 477; Holt
v. Penacook Savings Bank, (1883) 62 N. H. 551, 554.
21
OSee American Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co., (1935)
296 U.
S. 133, 139, 56 Sup. Ct. 9, 12, 80 L. Ed. 105.
2
nlMatthews v. Joyce, (1881) 85 N. C. 258, 266: "To deprive him of
this security without his intelligent assent to the surrender, would be a
fraud upon his rights and will not be upheld in a court of equity."
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Simmons v. Goodrich, (1882) 68 Ga. 750, 753; Alexander v. West,
(1931) 241 Ky. 541, 545-546, 44 S. W. (2d) 518, 520.
218Sibley v. McAllaster, (1836) 8 N. H. 389; Henderson v. Locke,
(1925) 153 Tenn. 108, 282 S. W. 193; Campbell, Cases on Suretyship 34-41.
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the securities. -14 However, for the reasons that a surety is not ordinarily entitled to pay a debt that has ceased to be legally binding
upon both himself and the principal debtor,2"5 that a security ordinarily follows and depends upon the principal obligation, and that
the "constructive" trust approach depends largely upon the fact of
the principal debtor's own personal liability, it would seem to follow that the creditor's interest in the securities should come to an
end with the expiration of his rights against all persons upon the
principal indebtedness. In such respects the reasoning that has
been developed does not require in their entirety the same results
reached by courts purporting to find an express trust for the
creditor's benefit to have been the specific intent of the parties to
218
the security agreement.
C. Where the Securities Proceed fron a Stranger to the Principal Obligation.-It has been seen that the courts reaching the
result of an express trust for the creditor's benefit in cases of securities found to have been specifically appropriated to the payment
of the principal obligation, as distinguished from the purpose of
merely personal indemnity to the surety, reach it likewise although
the securities have proceeded from a stranger to the principal obligation, although without as great emphasis upon fictitious indicia
of intent as in cases of securities proceeding from the principal
debtor.2 1 The trust result can here be justified only by finding
present all the necessary elements of an express trust, since the
non-competitive principle is lacking to justify any form of "constructive" trust. But in cases without such elements present the
creditor may neertheless have some rights in the securities of a
lower order than as a cestui que trust of either an express or a
"constructive" trust.
If either the personal liability or the property of a third-party
indemnitor have been given to a surety for the purpose of his
exoneration as well as his reimbursement, the third party has in
effect placed himself, either personally or through and to the extent of the property pledged, between the surety and the creditor as
the one who, next to the principal debtor, should pay the principal
indebtedness. Lacidng only a direct right in the creditor either
against him personally or against the property he has pledged, and
of course in no way hindering the creditor's primary right against
Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed.. 1147-1148.
2 Henderson v. Locke, (1925) 153 Tenn. 108, 282 S. W. 193.
216See above, pp. 348-357 of the text.
2142
5

21T See above, text at notes 113 and 114.
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the surety, the third-party indemnitor has become in effect the
surety and he who was surety has become in effect a sub-surety.
The situation is more exactly analogous to the promise to pay the
debt of another than had the security been furnished by the principal debtor-for the latter was by hypothesis already directly
liable to the creditor, whereas the third-party indemnitor or the
property he has pledged become directly liable to the creditor, if
at all, just as does the promisor in the typical third-party beneficiary contract, that is, solely by virtue of his agreement of exoneration.
The personal undertaking of a third-party indemnitor to exonerate the surety creates a typical third-party creditor-beneficiary
situation, subject, of course, to the condition of the surety's actual
damnification within the terms of the exoneration agreement.
Owing to the absence of the non-competitive principle, the creditor's
resulting right cannot be of any higher order than the surety's
own right would have been in the absence of the interposition of
the creditor, and is subject to any conditions, express or implied,
contained in the exoneration agreement. If the personal undertaking of the third-party indemnitor is only to reimburse the
surety for loss actually suffered in the form of payments already
made to the creditor, the situation is somewhat different from the
ordinary third-party creditor-beneficiary situation, in that by hypothesis the third party has not undertaken under any circumstances
to render his performance directly to the creditor. But the proliise of reimbursement is still an asset of the surety's estate which
the particular creditor, if he has not yet received payment in full,
should be able by prior diligence to appropriate to the exclusion of
the surety's other creditors, and should in all events share ratably
with them. Allowing the creditor to enforce by direct action the
surety's existing right of reimbursement from the third-party indemnitor, to the extent of the surety's loss actually suffered. would
require but a slight extension of the third-party creditor-beneficiary principle. By hypothesis the merely personal liability of the
third-party indemnitor would create no direct preferences in anyone, over either the indemnitor's or the surety's other creditors,
unless secured by prior diligence where that is still permissible.
Nor would it be a much further step from the ordinary thirdparty creditor-beneficiary principle to allow the particular creditor
to proceed directly against securities furnished by a third-party
indemnitor, to the extent that the surety's right of exoneration or
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reimbursement therefrom already has accrued, and to the extent
that an improper preference over the surety's other creditors
would not be created thereby. To the extent that the surety's own
right to realize upon the securities has already accrued, we need
not be concerned about the indemnitor's other creditors. But since
the third-party indemnitor is not himself liable upon the principal
obligation, and the non-competitive principle is therefore lacking,
the surety's right of exoneration or reimbursement from the securities to the extent of his maximum damnification or loss suffered
from his other assets belongs equally to his other creditors, and is
exhausted by a single complete exercise, so that any excess of the
securities over the amount of the surety's maximum damnification or loss from his other assets properly belongs to the indemnitor or to the latter's other creditors.
Without the aid of the non-competitive principle the third-party
creditor-beneficiary analogy is not alone sufficient to create preference rights in the particular creditor, except to the extent that
he may be permitted to secure them by the exercise of prior diligence. It would also seem to follow that the discharge of the
surety's own personal liability upon the principal indebtedness for
any other reason than that of his legally required payment of it, to
the extent that it would preclude his own right to resort to the
securities for the purpose of his exoneration or reimbursement,
should therefore bar the creditor likewise; and that the surety
should have at least the same right to release the securities that the
promisee has to release the promisor from his obligation under
the ordinary third-party creditor-beneficiary contract.21 8
2isProfessor Williston contends that "If .. .the security or the contract of the stranger is for the surety's exoneration, it might well be
deemed to be an asset of the surety which could be reached by the creditor
by a bill for equitable execution or equivalent procedure," on the analogy
of the creditor-beneficiary situation and of the similar procedure used to
reach a trust estate to satisfy a trustee's liability. 4 Williston, Treatise
on the Law of Contracts, rev. ed. 3625-3626, note 8. The following cases
appear to sustain Professor Williston's contention: Magoffin v. Boyle Nat'l
Bank of Danville, (1902) 24 Ky. L. Rep. 585, 69 S. W. 702; King v.
Harman's Heirs, (1834) 6 La. 607,26 Am.Dec. 485; Brown & Heywood Co.
v. Ligon, (C.C. Mo. 1899) 92 Fed. 851. In Henderson-Achert Lithographic Co. v. John Shillito Co., (1901) 64 Ohio St. 236, 251, 60 N. E. 295.
298, the court suggests that "where a stranger to the debt, for a sufficient
consideration, has agreed to assume and discharge the obligation of the
surety," the creditor "may adopt and enforce the promise, for it is the

property of his debtor, and its performance includes the payment of the debt."
It would seem that the only significance of the indemnitor having received

consideration would be in giving validity to his agreement, rather than in
making any distinction between compensated and uncompensated indenmitors
with respect to the creditor's rights. In Fields v. Letcher State Bank, (1934)
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CONCLUSION

It would require a too lengthy sunnary to recalitulate the content of the foregoing discussion. It is believed that enough has
been said to show that, if a false precedent in the land of its own
nativity has deceived great ininds in this country, it has deceived
them only to the extent that it is sound in principle. Such a form
of evolution is by no means unknown either in equity or the common law. Through nuich travail another principle "takes its own
place in the family of legal principles "-'1-one that is believed to be
preferable both to the "rule of L.v parle Waring" and to the Scottish rule, and to provide an adle(uiate rationale of the results reached
by niost of the American cases, regardless of whether the .ecttrities received by the surety from the principal debtor aret fotnd to
have been specifically appropriated to the payment of the principal
obligation, or to have been given for the more restricted ltrpose
of the suretv's indemnity only. Dean Potnd did not without
reason, or upon the basis of a false precedent alone, conclude that
"itiselementary that a creditor is entitled to enforce for his own
benefit any securities which the principal debtor has, given his
surety by way of indemnity."-"-"
256 Ky. 592. 76 S. W. (2d) 908. Kelley Fields and his wife. Calliedoiiia
Fields, gave to the sureties of Kelley Fields a note and mortgage to secure
them againist loss. The court held the principal creditor entitled to the
benefit of the note and mortgage, although it was assumed that the Sureties
were not entitled to enforce the same for the reason that they had not
paid the principal indebtedness; and the court did not so much as discuss
the significance of the fact, which had appeared upon an earlier appeal.
Fields v. Letcher State Bank. (1932) 246 Ky. 229. 54 S. V. (2d) 910,
that the real estate in question had belonged to Calliedonia Fields. a stranger
to the principal indebtedness. See also Burroughs v.United States. (C.C.
N.Y. 1856) 2 Paine 569. Fed. Cas. No. 2.202.
2192 Williston. Treatise on the Law of Contracts. rev. ed.. 1049.
22 Harlan County v. Whitney, (1902) 65 Neb. 105. 106. 90 N. W. 993.

